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Strategic interactions of urban land
developers in the housing market
Abstract
This thesis studies the supply side of the housing market taking into account the
strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis starts by
reviewing the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies
where strategic interactions are taken into account. Next, we develop a model with two
urban land developers, who rst decide the quality of housing and then compete in prices,
considering that the marginal production costs depend on the housing quality. First, we
analyze the price competition game and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price
game. Finally, we examine the rst stage of the game and determine numerically the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game.
In the price competition game, our results show that the equilibrium price of an urban
land developer is an increasing function of its own quality, while it is a non-monotonic
function of the rivals quality. The behavior of the equilibrium prots reveals that, in
general, urban land developers gain by di¤erentiating their quality. However, the urban
land developer located at the Central Business District (CBD), may prefer to have the
same quality than the rival when transportation costs are high by exploiting its locational
advantage.
The analysis of the rst stage of the game also reveals that, in general, the rms best
response is to di¤erentiate their quality and that, in most cases, there are two subgame
perfect Nash equilibria that involve quality di¤erentiation. However, the results depend
on transportation costs and the quality valuation parameter. For small quality valuations,
in equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and, if the unit transportation costs are
high, only the urban land developers located at the CBD operates. For higher quality
valuations, all the consumers are served. Furthermore, the equilibrium qualities and
prots are increasing with quality valuation parameter.
Keywords: land urban developers, strategic interaction, vertical di¤erentiation
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Interação estratégica dos produtores no
mercado de habitação
Resumo
Esta tese estuda a oferta no mercado da habitação, tendo em conta as interações es-
tratégicas que ocorrem entre os produtores de habitação. A tese revê a literatura sobre
a oferta de habitação, concluindo que existem poucos estudos que tenham tido em conta
as interações estratégicas. De seguida, desenvolvemos um modelo com dois produtores de
habitação, que primeiro decidem a qualidade da habitação e depois competem em preços,
considerando que os custos marginais de produção dependem da qualidade. Primeiro
analisamos o jogo em preços e caracterizamos o equilíbrio de Nash. Posteriormente, ex-
aminamos o primeiro estágio do jogo e determinamos numericamente o equilíbrio perfeito
em todos os subjogos (SPNE) do jogo.
No jogo de competição em preços, os resultados mostram que, o preço de equilíbrio,
é uma função crescente da qualidade da habitação, sendo uma função não monótona
da qualidade do rival. O lucro de equilíbrio revela que, geralmente, os produtores de
habitação têm ganhos em diferenciar a qualidade. No entanto, o produtor localizado
no Centro (CBD), pode preferir oferecer a mesma qualidade que o rival, caso os custos
unitários de transporte sejam elevados, através da sua vantagem de localização. A análise
do primeiro estágio do jogo, revela que, geralmente, a melhor resposta de um produtor é
a de diferenciar a qualidade. Na maior parte dos casos existem dois SPNE que envolvem
essa diferenciação. No entanto, os resultados dependem dos custos unitários de transporte
e da valorização da qualidade por parte do consumidor. Para uma reduzida valorização
da qualidade, em equilíbrio, o mercado não é totalmente coberto e, se o custo unitário
de transporte é elevado, apenas o produtor localizado no CBD opera no mercado. Para
uma valorização elevada da qualidade, todos os consumidores são servidos. Além disso,
as qualidades e os lucros de equilíbrio são crescentes com a valorização da qualidade.
Palavras-chave: produtores no mercado da habitação, interação estratégica, diferen-
ciação vertical
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The object of this study is the housing supply. We start by a literature review on the
supply of new housing. The objective in this chapter is to elaborate a systematic literature
review that shows the various theoretical and empirical studies about housing supply and
to identify the theoretical bases of these studies, so as to discover how can we make a
contribution to a better understanding of this theme.
In the housing market, the demand side has been widely studied. On the contrary,
many authors like DiPasquale (1999) state that the supply side is still understudied.
Sometimes it is di¢ cult to identify the theoretical underpinnings of certain empirical
and theoretical studies. However one can identify three major theoretical foundations:
the investment literature; the urban economic theory and more recently the industrial
organization literature. In the urban economic theory there is evidence, supported by
studies like Arnott and Igarashi (2000), of imperfect competition in the housing market.
That enables and justies the growing literature that applies game theory / industrial
organization to the housing market. Our work is in the intersection between industrial
organization and urban economic theory. Our review on the articles that use game theory/
industrial organization models of housing supply, shows that the strategic interaction
between urban land developers is still understudied. Thus we believe there is a need to
develop theoretical models of the urban land developers.
Strategic interaction models of housing supply may enable us to understand how land
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developers make their decisions regarding the house location, house quality and prices. It
may permit us to explore the market structure of the housing market and test if the market
is competitive or if the urban land developers have some oligopolistic power. There is a
extensive literature in industrial economics about vertical product di¤erentiation models,
including models with endogenous quality choice. But most of the literature analyzes
general theoretical models, that do not take into account the specicities of the housing
market. In particular, one feature that is important in the housing market is the house
location. Furthermore, di¤erences in quality are likely to a¤ect both the marginal cost of
construction as well as the xed costs.
Our specic goal is to study the supply side of the housing market taking into account
the type of strategic interactions that occur between urban land developers. So in the
third chapter we develop a model of the behavior of urban land developers, incorporating
the specicities of the housing market, such as the location of the producers and consid-
ering variable and xed costs of quality improvements. We discuss a model where there
are two urban land developers, who take quality and price decisions independently and si-
multaneously. In this model, producers rst decide the housing quality and then compete
in prices. We assume that one of the producers stays at the CBD while the other has a
more decentralized location. Our model also considers, in the utility function a transport
cost per unit of distance.
We start by examining the price competition stage game, considering the quality
levels as given. We derive the demand functions and we impose some conditions about
the quality levels of the two urban land developers, so that the demand is positive for
at least one of the urban land developers, we also dene some cut-o¤ valuations that
enabled us to simplify the exposition. We obtained analytically the Nash equilibrium
of the price game considering all possible cases. Next we perform a numerical analysis,
using a GAUSS program, to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. For each
vector of quality levels, we compute the equilibrium prices, prot and type of equilibrium.
Then, we examine how the equilibrium prices and prots vary with the quality levels.
In the fourth chapter we solve the rst stage of the quality-price game, obtaining
2
the equilibrium housing qualities. Since it is impossible to get an analytical solution for
the equilibrium qualities, we determine the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
numerically, using a GAUSS program. In this chapter we present the results of this
numerical analysis. We start by analyzing the best response functions of the two urban
land developers for various parameters values. Next we study the impact of changing the
unit transportation cost and the lowest quality valuation parameter. In particular, we
analyze the type of equilibrium for di¤erent combinations of these two parameter values
and we study how the equilibrium values of qualities and prots change with the unit
transportation cost and with the lowest quality valuation parameter.
3
4
Chapter 2
New housing supply: what do we
know and how can we learn more?
2.1 Introduction
This study reviews the literature on housing supply. The focus of our review is the
literature on the supply of new housing, so we do not consider the renovation and repair
of the existing stock.
While the literature on housing supply has grown in the last years, housing supply still
remains understudied relatively to demand. In fact, many authors in their reviews about
housing supply conclude that it has been understudied (see, among others, Quigley, 1979;
Olsen, 1987; Smith, 1988; and DiPasquale, 1999). The reason certainly is not the lack
of interest but perhaps, as argues Rosenthal (1999), the inexistence of adequate data for
empirical studies. Another reason may be the di¢ culty of modelling the housing supply
as referred by Quigley (1979). The rst di¢ culty is that housing services are di¢ cult
to measure. The second is that in the housing market we observe price times quantity,
unlike other markets where we see the price for a standard unit. The third di¢ culty is
that housing supply is the result of the decision making by land developers and by the
actual owners of housing. To understand the micro foundations of housing supply, we
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would need data such that the unit of observation is the individual supplier. However
it is very di¢ cult to obtain data on the behavior of land developers. This explains why
the great majority of the articles of new housing supply analyze aggregate data. Like
DiPasquale (1999) says, there are few articles that use micro data (where the decision
maker, the developer, is the unit of analysis).
Most studies in the literature of housing supply involve the estimation of an empirical
model, with the objective of identifying the determinants of new housing supply and
estimating the price elasticity of supply. As a consequence, a great part of this survey
is dedicated to the empirical studies on housing supply and summarizes the ndings
regarding these two issues.
Although, in some cases, it is di¢ cult to identify the theoretical underpinnings of
the empirical studies, one can identify two major theoretical foundations: the investment
literature and the urban economic theory. The main di¤erence in these two approaches
is the treatment of land. Studies based on the investment theory treat land as an input
in the production of new housing and tend to ignore the special characteristics of land
as a factor of production while those based on urban economic theory incorporate the
land market into the theoretical structure. Moreover, the models based on the investment
theory assume that the home-building industry is composed of competitive rms and
that they face rising factor cost schedules for labor and for building materials. However,
according to the urban economic theory, land is di¤erent from other factors of production.
Land prices depend on the stock of housing, not on the ow or level of building activity, as
a result a rise in house prices initially generates excess returns, but the ow of construction
increases only temporarily above the normal level. As the stock of housing grows, land
prices rise and eventually absorb the excess returns and construction declines to its normal
level.
The investment theory framework is well illustrated in the work of Poterba (1984) and
Topel and Rosen (1988). Poterba (1984) uses an asset market form to model the housing
market and denes supply as net investment in structures. Topel and Rosen (1988)
consider housing production decisions as housing investment decisions. On the other
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hand, Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994) and Mayer and Somerville (2000) are reference
papers based on the urban economic theory. Besides the inuence of the investment
theory and urban economic theory, there is a growing literature that applies game theory
/ industrial organization to the housing market. We believe that this new branch of the
literature can provide an important theoretical contribution to the housing supply and
suggest some clues to future empirical work on this theme. We dedicate section 2.5 to the
review on strategic interaction models.
Besides the di¤erences in the theoretical foundations, the studies also di¤er in the
type of data and estimation techniques used, thus in our literature review we provide
information on these two aspects. In the literature there are two approaches that have
been used to estimate housing supply: the reduced-form estimation and the structural
form estimation. In the reduced-form estimation the equilibrium price is a function of
supply and demand factors. On the other hand, in the structural approach the aggregate
supply is estimated directly with construction as a function of price and cost shifters.
As mentioned before it is not always easy to classify the empirical papers according to
their theoretical foundations, thus we did not attempt to do so in this work. However, we
decided to organize the survey of the empirical articles in two distinct sections. First, we
revise the earlier empirical studies, from Maisel (1953) to Topel and Rosen (1988). These
studies are inuenced by the investment theory. Next we revise the more recent studies,
starting with Dipasquale and Wheaton (1992).
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we start by revising
the earlier empirical studies whereas in section 3 we present the more recent empirical
studies. In section 4 we analyze the determinants of housing supply. In section 5 we
summarize the game theoretical models that have been used to model the housing supply.
Finally, the last section, summarizes the main conclusions of the chapter and presents
some ideas for future research.
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2.2 Earlier empirical studies
Table 2.1 summarizes the earlier empirical studies, indicating the country, sample period,
estimation method, whether the regression is done in levels or di¤erences and, nally the
estimates of the price elasticity of supply (PES).
Although Maisel (1953) provides a description of builders of single-family housing in
USA, namely in the San Francisco area, and the factors that inuence their construction
decisions, in the literature on housing supply the study by Muth (1960) is considered
the rst empirical study. Muth (1960) assumes a neoclassical e¢ cient markets view of
the housing market, where supply responsiveness is innitely elastic in the long run. He
develops a stock adjustment model and tests the relation between price and quantity of
new housing construction. He was unable to reject the null hypotheses of a perfectly
elastic supply. However, there are several problems with the Muth (1960) study. One
of the problems is the small sample: annual data from 1915 to 1934 and with the war
years omitted. Another critique is the fact that his estimation does not adjust for serial
correlation or for the possibility of simultaneity bias between the price and quantity of new
housing construction. Olsen (1987) also points out signicant methodological problems,
particularly on the issue of including both input prices and quantity in the reduced form
model.
Leeuw and Ekanem (1971) use a reduced form model. In their paper they use informa-
tion on rent di¤erences among metropolitan areas in the USA to estimate the elasticity
of supply of rental housing. Using cross sectional data, they estimated two equations and
combined the results of the reduced form estimation with information from other studies
on the parameters of the demand equation to draw conclusions about the behavior of
the supply of housing services. Leeuw and Ekanem (1971) estimate an elasticity of sup-
ply from 0.3 to 0.7, suggesting that the supply of housing is inelastic. In addition, they
suggest that one of the sources of the inelasticity are the diseconomies of scale.
Follain (1979) follows the formulation of Muth (1960). He uses annual aggregated
data from 1947 to 1975 and employs two measures of the quantity of new housing stock.
8
Follain (1979) tests the null hypotheses of a perfectly elastic supply. Like Muth (1960)
he nds no signicant positive relationship between quantity and price, and concludes
that the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic long run supply of new construction cannot be
rejected.
Whitehead (1974) used quarterly data from 1955 to 1972 for the UK. With this time
series he develops and estimates a series of related stock adjustment models. The results
for the price elasticity of supply range from 0.5 to 2.
Rydell (1982) has a very complete study of the price elasticity of housing supply. He
examines the components of supply response to demand shifts. Rydell (1982) argues
that the supply of housing services available to consumers can increase in three ways: (i)
existing housing can be upgraded by repair; (ii) the housing inventory can be expanded
either by using existing residential land more intensely or by increasing the amount of
residential land; (iii) the proportion of existing housing that is occupied can be increased.
So the overall supply elasticity is a composite of these three components. His study
supports the conclusion that the repair elasticity is very low, that the inventory elasticity
is very large, and that the occupancy elasticity is greater than zero. Rydell (1982) used
cross sectional data from 59 metropolitan areas in the USA, in the years of 1974 and
1976. Using a reduced form estimation he estimates a long run price elasticity of supply
of 11.3. He nds that the short-run price elasticity of supply (PES) is lower, 0.24 or 0.83,
depending on the market occupancy rate.
9
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The attempts to directly model housing supply, in the 80s, comes from the theoretical
background of the investment literature. These models assume that the home-building
industry is composed of competitive rms. Two reference studies are Poterba (1984) and
Topel and Rosen (1988).
Poterba (1984) models the housing market using an asset approach, he denes supply
as net investment in structures. Poterba assumes that investment supply depends on real
house price, the real price of alternative investment projects, and the construction wage
rate. To explain the impact of credit rationing he includes alternative indicators of credit
availability. Knowing that houses take time to build, he uses one-quarter ahead forecasts
of real house price and the real price of alternative investment projects. Since new houses
take time to sell, he adjusts real house price to reect interest costs incurred during the
period from completion to sale. He estimates various linear models using quarterly data
from 1964 to 1982. Investment supply is measured as the value of one-family structures put
in place or as a rate of new housing investment dened relative to aggregate real output.
In the best-tting models, the elasticity of the rate of new construction with respect to
real house prices varies from 0.5 to 2.3. He detects a signicant relationship between
credit availability and the rate of housing investment, supporting the "supply e¤ect"
hypothesis that credit availability a¤ects the ow of new construction. The measures
of construction costs, such as the construction wage, produced unexpected signs and no
statistical signicance.
Topel and Rosen (1988) study new housing supply by considering whether current
asset prices are su¢ cient for housing investment decisions. If they are, then the short-run
and long-run investment supplies are identical; if they are not, because of costs associated
with moving resources between industries, then short-run supply is less elastic than long-
run supply. As a result, builders and developers must anticipate future asset prices in
making current construction decisions.
They incorporate these supply dynamics by specifying the industrys cost function in
terms of both the level and the rate of change in construction, along with cost variables.
They estimate a myopic model and then a model with expectations and internal adjust-
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ment costs. In their myopic model, production costs are una¤ected by the rate of change
in construction activity so current construction decisions are based solely on current asset
price and marginal cost. If production costs are a¤ected by the rate of change in con-
struction activity, then internal adjustment costs are present and short-run supply is less
elastic than long-run supply. These internal adjustment costs introduce expectations of
future asset prices as determinants of new housing supply since current prices by them-
selves fail to reect all relevant information. Using quarterly data for 1963 through 1983,
they estimate alternative versions of their myopic and internal adjustment cost models.
They measure new housing investment as the number of single-family housing starts. The
expected real interest rate, the expected ination rate, lags of these rates, and alternative
measures of construction input prices are included as cost shifters. The number of months
from start to sale for single-family homes is included as an indicator of market conditions.
In both the myopic and adjustment cost frameworks, nominal interest rates inuence
construction activity, but construction costs have insignicant e¤ects on housing invest-
ment. The myopic model generates new housing supply elasticities ranging from 1.2 to
1.4. They nd that the short-run PES is lower, about 1. Their empirical results reject the
myopic model in favor of the adjustment cost model. Supply elasticities are calculated
to reveal the investment impact of both transitory and permanent housing price shocks.
The presence of the time to sale variable considerably reduces the magnitude of the sup-
ply responses. For their preferred model, a permanent 1% rise in housing price increases
housing investment by about 1.7% in the short run and 2.8% in the long run. However,
nearly all of the change in construction activity occurs within one year.
As in Poterba (1984) their measures of construction costs do not have a signicative
impact on housing starts, the cost of capital to the builders are explained by real interest
rates. Topel and Rosen (1988) conclude that real interest rates and expected ination
have a signicative impact on starts. They argue that the impact of ination is di¢ cult
to explain and that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on real interest rates is too big to
just reect the cost of capital. They also argue that the impact of ination may reect
changes in the velocity at which houses are sold at market prices, to test this explanation
12
they put the median months on the market for new houses, their results show a signicant
and negative impact of that variable on house starts. But again they argue that the e¤ect
is too big to reect the holding costs related to sales delay.
2.3 Recent empirical studies
The contributions from the investment literature, such as Poterba (1984) and Topel and
Rosen (1988), do not take into account the importance of land as an input. However,
as we know, from the literature on urban economic theory, land is di¤erent from other
factors of production. Urban economic theory incorporates the land market on its theory
and gives us equilibrium models in which the stock of houses always equals the urban
population.
Table 2.2 summarizes the more recent empirical studies on housing supply.
DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) approach reects the dynamic nature of housing sup-
ply by incorporating a stock adjustment process and a long run equilibrium framework
based on urban spatial theory. The latter theory implies that urban spatial growth gen-
erates higher land prices in order to attract the land necessary for new housing. By
denition, the net change in the housing stock equals new construction less replacement
investment. New construction in turn reects how quickly the housing stock adjusts to its
long run equilibrium level. The long run equilibrium housing stock depends on housing
price and input prices.
This housing supply framework has two important implications for understanding new
housing supply. First, it implies that construction activity reects the adjustment process
as the current stock moves to its long run equilibrium level. Second, it indicates that the
housing price level a¤ects new construction only to the extent that the current housing
stock di¤ers from its long run equilibrium level for this price level. As such, changes in
housing price rather than its level attract the land necessary for long run urban spatial
growth.
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DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) specify new construction (housing starts) as a linear
function of new housing price, the short-term real interest rate (the real cost of short
term construction nancing), the price of agricultural land, construction costs (indices for
construction), and lagged housing stock. The change in aggregate employment and the
number of months from completion to sale for new homes are also introduced as indicators
of housing market conditions. They estimate alternative linear versions of their supply
framework using aggregate annual data from 1963 through 1990. They restrict their
analysis to single-family housing and measure new construction as the number of single-
family housing starts. In all specications, the coe¢ cient on housing price is signicantly
positive.
Their estimates of the long-run PES range from 1.0 to 1.2. They conclude that the
stock adjusts to its long run equilibrium through new construction very slowly, the rate of
adjustment is about 2% per year. On the other hand, real short-term interest rates have a
signicant negative impact on construction and land costs do not have a signicant impact
on construction. Just like Topel and Rosen (1988) and Poterba (1984) they did not nd
a signicant relationship between construction costs and the level of construction. Like
Topel and Rosen they add months on the market for new homes to the supply equation
and they also nd that sales time has a large impact on construction, they argue that the
magnitude of the coe¢ cients of sales delays and interest costs is too large and that the
importance of those variables indicates that price is not enough to explain housing starts.
They also argue that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient appears to be too large to simply
reect holding costs associated with sales delays. They include, as a market indicator,
the change in employment, a variable that has a positive impact on construction. Adding
this variable and the sales time to the model improved the t of the model. DiPasquale
and Wheaton (1994) presents strong evidence of a gradual price adjustment process in the
market for single family housing in contrast to previous studies that made assumptions of
instantaneous market clearing. Their results conrms the idea that the housing market
functioning is very di¤erent from other nancial asset markets.
In their model, Mayer and Somerville (2000), incorporate the time taken in the de-
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velopment process. In addition, they use more recent time series econometrics methods.
One of the di¤erences of this model relatively to DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) is that
Mayer and Somerville use price and cost changes and not their levels. They argue that
housing starts is a ow variable so it should be a function of ow variables. Consequently
they use lagged price changes and lagged cost changes in their model. The results of this
model is a price elasticity of housing starts of about 6.0 and a low price elasticity of the
stock of about 0.08. They justify that di¤erence saying that the low price elasticity of the
stock is due to the fact that housing starts are a small percentage of the stock. They also
nd that changes in construction costs are not statistically signicant, and that time to
sales is statistically signicant and the coe¢ cient is large, which means that time to sale
has a signicant impact on construction.
A great majority of the studies that try to estimate the supply concentrates on the
problem of single-family housing starts but there are two articles that study the problem of
the supply of multifamily housing. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992) estimated a construc-
tion equation for multifamily rental housing where the level of multifamily construction,
measured by the units in structures with more than one unit, depends on how the asset
price of rental housing compares with the construction costs. Asset prices are a function
of rents, vacancies, and the capitalization rate. The estimated model explains variation
in construction with rents, vacancies, the capitalization rate, construction costs, lagged
construction, and construction by the federal government of the USA. With this model
they estimate a long-run rent elasticity of supply of 6.8, in this model the construction
costs obtained in a rm of construction, is statistically signicant and has the expected
negative sign.
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) indicates that there are signicant di¤erences in supply
elasticities between countries. They argue that those di¤erences seem to be correlated
with the stringency of the regulatory framework in place for land and housing developers.
Goodman (1998) says that supply conditions vary also within a country. Pryce (1999)
used data from England at a local district level and constructed a simultaneous equation
model of housing construction. The model compares elasticities of supply between two
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cross-sectional periods, a boom in 1988 and a slump in 1992. The article discussed the
rationality and tested the existence of, a backward-bending supply relationship. Pryce
(1999) concludes that supply was concave in both periods and that it bends backwards
during the boom period. He nds that there is a structural break between the boom and
the bust period, the elasticity of supply is higher in the slump period (1.03) and smaller in
the boom (0.58), but he concludes that there are considerable variations across districts.
Blackley (1999) used annual data from USA for the period 19501994. The basic
model expresses residential construction as a linear function of new housing price, the
prices of construction materials and labor, the real interest rate and the expected ination
rates. He also considered the e¤ects of land price, lagged housing stock and the price of
nonresidential construction. The variables are expressed in levels. The rst conclusion is
that the new housing supply is relatively price elastic in the long run. Estimates of the long
run price elasticity of new housing supply range from 1.6 to 3.7. However in the models
with variables expressed in di¤erences, the long-run elasticity is lower, about 0.8. The
second conclusion, is that nominal interest rates inuence new housing supply directly.
And the third conclusion, is that the temporal properties of each data series should be
considered when specifying and estimating time-series models of new housing supply,
for example, with variables expressed in levels, supply is elastic, but with explanatory
variables expressed in di¤erences, supply is inelastic.
Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) estimate the PES of housing for USA and for UK.
Using a long time series both countries, as we can see from Table 2.2, they divided the
sample between prewar and postwar. The results for the PES reveal greater values for
USA comparing with UK, concluding that the USA market is more elastic. Moreover, the
values of PES are higher in the prewar period both in USA and UK.
Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo (2005) estimated supply elasticities for 45 metropolitan
areas in the USA following the model of Mayer and Sommerville (2000). They conclude
that the estimates of the price elasticity of supply varied signicantly according to the
metropolitan area. Metropolitan areas that were strongly regulated have low elasticities
while metropolitan areas that are less regulated have a wide range of behavior. In partic-
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ular, metropolitan areas with low regulation and with fast growth tend to have high price
elasticities whereas those with slow growth have low price elasticities. They also conclude
that population density is an important variable in explaining supply elasticity and that
metropolitan areas with high population density have lower elasticities.
Meen (2005) states that, in comparison with the USA, the price elasticities of supply
in England are low, and that the Englands price elasticities of supply have been falling
since 1970. He concludes that the price elasticities of supply is low in all the regions
of England (price elasticities are approximately 0 since 1990 in all the English regions).
Meen argues that it is di¢ cult to incorporate information about planning controls into
the time-series models, although that may partially explain the results as Malpezzi and
Mayo (1997) defend. By introducing dummy variables, Meen (2005) concludes that there
are additional factors that explain the low price elasticity of supply.
In their paper, Levin and Pryce (2009) works out the UK market. This paper gives a
great contribution to the problem of the price elasticity of supply, rst by demonstrating
that it varies over time due to changes in real interest rates. They conclude that increases
in the long run real interest rates cause house price rises and a low elasticity of supply, this
in the absence of restrictive regulation and market imperfections. The article considered
also how some market imperfections can interact with planning constrains and building
regulations to form the response of supply to price changes. They argue that these may
conduce to cyclical asymmetry in price elasticity of supply - the tendency for the quantity
supplied to respond very slowly to outward shifts of demand, but very rapidly to inward
shifts.
As we can see from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 the estimate of the long-run PES of housing
varies considerably across studies. However, excluding some earlier studies like Muth
(1960) and Follain (1979), we can reject a perfectly elastic supply of housing, and we
can conclude that at least in the long run supply is elastic with respect to price. We can
conclude also by the recent studies that the PES of housing is higher in the USA comparing
with UK, so the values should be di¤erent across countries. Another conclusion that can
be made observing the results across studies is that the PES of housing varies at regional
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and local level, there are several studies that conducted this analysis and came to the same
conclusion. We can state that the short-run PES is lower than the long-run PES. We can
also state that the results vary with econometric models used and with the specication.
For example, the use of variables in di¤erences seem to lead to lower values in the long-run
PES of housing.
2.4 Determinants of housing supply
In the last two sections we revised the empirical studies but did not mention, in a sys-
tematic manner, the regressors of the housing supply models. However it is worthwhile
to summarize the various categories of explanatory variables that have been used as well
as the results that have been obtained. This will give us an overall picture of the results
obtained in the existing empirical evidence.
The set of explanatory variables and the result regarding their impact on housing
supply has varied across studies. Classifying the regressors in 8 categories, Table 2.3
shows selected references that include in their study that category of regressors.
As we can see by the number of references in Table 2.3, the most utilized regressors
are those related with nancing costs and with construction costs.
To have a more clear view of the sign and signicancy of the regressors classied in
the same categories of Table 2.3, we show in Table 2.4 the number of papers where that
regressor has a positive and statistically signicant impact, the number of papers where
that regressor has a negative and statistically signicant impact, and the number of papers
where the regressor are not statistically signicant.
In the category of nancing costs, which includes the interest rate in various forms,
almost all the empirical studies conclude that the cost of nancing determines negatively
the housing starts. This result is consistent with the theory. Levin and Pryce (2009)
concludes that changes in the long-run real interest rate cause a low PES.
Theoretically, construction costs should be an important determinant of housing sup-
ply, and should have a negative sign, reecting the negative relation between housing
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Table 2.3: Selected references for each category of regressors.
Category of regressors Selected References
Financing costs Follain (1979);Topel and Rosen (1988);Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994);
Blackley (1999); Mayer and Somerville (2000); Kenny (2003);
Meen (2005); Hwang and Quigley (2006)
Construction costs Follain (1979); Poterba (1984);Dipasquale and Wheaton (1992);
Blackley (1999); Somerville (1999); Mayer and Somerville (2000);
Kenny (2003); Meen (2005)
Vacancy rate Leeuw and Ekanem (1971); Dipasquale and Wheaton (1992)
Sales delay Topel and Rosen (1988); Mayer and Somerville (2000);
Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994)
Ination rate Topel and Rosen (1988); Blackley (1999)
Stock of housing Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994); Blackley (1999);
Mayer and Somerville (2000)
Price of agricultural land Dipasquale and Wheaton (1994); Blackley (1999)
Regulation Pryce (1999); Hwang and Quigley (2006)
starts and construction costs. However, Table 2.4 shows that the results for the category
of construction costs (which include material costs, wage costs or an index of both of
them) are inconclusive. Although the expected negative impact is obtained if 5 articles,
an equal number of papers shows a positive impact and in 2 other studies the construction
costs are not statistically signicant. As DiPasquale (1999) refers, most of the empirical
literature on housing supply has the problem of the measurement of construction costs.
Thus one possible explanation for the inconclusive results is the quality of the data used
to measure the variable. It is interesting to note that studies that use more disaggregated
data, such as Somerville (1999), conclude that the variable has signicant and negative
impact on housing supply.
The evidence on the impact of the vacancy rate is scarce, since only 3 studies include
this variable as a regressor. Two of this studies nd a negative impact, which is accor-
20
Table 2.4: Results of the empirical studies by category of regressors.
Category of regressors Positive Negative Not signicant
Financing costs  9 1
Construction costs 5 5 2
Vacancy rate  2 1
Sales delay  3 
Ination rate  2 
Stock of housing 1 2 2
Price of agricultural land 1 1 1
Regulation  2 1
dance with theory, while one of the studies nds out that the variable is not statistically
signicant.
The variable sales delay is included only in three studies. However its impact on
housing supply is negative and statistically signicant in all the papers reviewed, which is
theoretically consistent: if the houses take a very long time to sell the consequence is less
housing starts. It is also worthwhile to note that the magnitude of the impact of sales
delay is quite big in the three studies that include this variable.
The two studies that include ination rate as a regressor, reveal a signicant and
negative e¤ect on housing starts, which is also consistent with theory.
The evidence regarding the impact of the stock of housing (normally with a lag) on
housing starts is inconclusive: 2 articles reveal a negative impact, 2 studies show a non-
signicant impact and 1 study nds a positive impact. Similarly, the e¤ect of the price
of agricultural land is also not clear as the three studies that include this variable reach
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completely di¤erent results.
In the category of regulation we include the planning controls, which is used in two
papers. The reason why this type of regressor is not used more often is probably related
with the lack of information, in particular it is di¢ cult to have a time series regarding
this variable. In theory, places where the regulatory controls are more restrictive have
less housing starts, hence the sign of the coe¢ cient should be negative. Two of the three
studies that include regulation show the expected theoretical result whereas in one study
the variable is not statistically signicant. It is also important to mention that Green,
Malpezzi and Mayo (2005) concludes that metropolitan areas that were more regulated
have lower PES.
2.5 Strategic interaction models
In the three previous sections we revised the empirical literature on housing supply. How-
ever, within the housing supply literature, there are other studies that we would like to
highlight. We want to review also the application of game theory/industrial organization
to model housing supply. Unfortunately, has we will show, there are very few studies in
this area.1
One of the most important application of game theory that we found was Baudewyns
(2000). This article focus on the strategic interactions of land developers, analyzing the
decisions made by two land developers that decide independently two variables: price and
quality. He assumes that one rm is at the Central Business District (CBD) and builds
houses in this location while the other builds in a more decentralized area. In his article,
he considers a rst stage in which the duopolists choose the level of housing quality,
where the quality is dened as a function of accessibility and housing quality. In the
second and last stage, the two rms simultaneously compete in prices to attract potential
1Strategic interaction models have also been used in other related areas. For instance, Firoozi, Hollas,
Rutherford, and Thomson (2006) present a game theoretic model of property tax assessment and provide
evidence of asymmetric information in residential property assessments. Similarly, Anglin and Arnott
(1991), analyze the terms of the brokerage contract between a house seller and his agent, applying the
literature on the principal-agent problem.
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clients. Baudewyns concludes that the decentralized developer can adopt two kinds of
strategies depending on the distance and the anticipated level of quality at the CBD. If the
centralized land developer o¤ers high quality apartments, then the decentralized developer
o¤ers low-quality housing units in the CBD, the idea of the decentralized developer is to
di¤erentiate its residential quality to soften price competition in the second stage, in the
suburban areas, it o¤ers a higher quality of housing but the residential quality is lower,
because of the transportation costs.
Ong, Sing and Choo (2004) apply a game theoretic Nash equilibrium approach to the
issue of planning exibility within the land use zoning. This work is based in the land use
planning in Singapore, and in the example of the white sitesprogramme in that country.
The authors refer that exibility in land use may be valuable, but it potentially introduces
a supply ine¢ ciency through the uncertainty in the development decision-making process.
The main proposition is that interaction between developers of proximate sites may result
in a suboptimal supply situation. The authors demonstrate that a rst-mover advantage
exists such that subsequent white sitesreleased shortly after the rst white sitesare
likely to fetch lower land prices.
Wang and Zhou (2000), study one well documented problem in the real estate markets
literature the excess vacancy or overbuilding in the market. The article models over-
building as a two-stage innite-horizon non-cooperative game between land developers.
The game is divided into two stages. In the rst stage each developer simultaneously and
independently decides to build a certain number of real properties to meet the demand
level. In the second stage given the available supply and demand of the market, developers
select the optimal rental price for their properties. The authors conclude that it is natural
to observe oversupply in real estate markets, developers have the incentive to build once
they nd a development opportunity. As consequence, developers as a whole, will supply
more houses into the market than the level of demand. After the oversupply, developers
will stop building until the demand absorb the existing supply. Their model explains
the long-lasting overbuilding in real estate markets without some traditional explanations
such as agency costs, irrational behavior or uncertainty of demand.
23
Chu and Sing (2007) incorporate strategic interaction in the modeling of optimal
timing decision for real estate development projects. In their article they examine the
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for a duopoly real option model, with two rms
with asymmetric demand functions. In the presence of preemptive threat, rms may forgo
the waiting options, and invest earlier than what the monopolistic real option models
would predict. In their symmetric duopoly model rms are identical and products are
homogeneous. So there are no relative advantages in the price function of the rst mover
over the next. Short bursts and recession induced overbuilding are two outcomes in the
authors model. The model predicts that those two phenomena occur in earlier phases of
market cycles, and not in the state of recession. In a recessed market with high volatility,
the two rms will choose the waiting strategies.
Other important articles on housing supply examine the home building industry, its
structure and industrial organization. Somerville (1999) states that his article is the
rst analytical treatment of the industrial organization of housing supply. He says that
traditional studies of housing markets assume house building as a perfectly competitive
industry. This study uses metropolitan area level data on the average size of homebuilder
rms and homebuilder market concentration, to analyze the market structure of the in-
dustry. He concludes that there is a systematic variation across metropolitan areas on
the housing market, this variation occurs in the average size of builders and in the market
share for the largest builders. So he argues that the results are more consistent with treat-
ing the industry as monopolistically competitive with a di¤erentiated product. He also
concludes that home builders are larger in more active housing markets, and they are also
larger where there is a bigger supply of developed land adequate for larger developments.
He argues that the type of regulating jurisdiction that establishes land-use regulation has
inuence on the builder size and market concentration.
Ball (2003) in his paper examines the way that the housebuilding industry is organized
and tries to identify some implications for the wider operation of housing markets. He ar-
gues that there are several characteristics of the industry that seem to reject the idea of a
competitive industry. First, there are di¤erent institutional forms within and across coun-
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tries, housebuilding industrial structures vary considerably. Second, rms adopt strategies
and they know, from experience, that they are important in determining prot. He states
that strategic behavior can not have e¤ect on market outcomes in a competitive model.
The article analysis potential economies of scale, market factors, information asymmetries,
regulation and risk. Ball argues that the great variety of ways in which housing is built,
is not the reason that explain its industrial organization. Things like market instability,
locational specicity, the markets where the houses are sold, information, strategic be-
havior, regulation in labour markets, land availability and the regulation, are factors that
a¤ect the size of rms. The author states also that strategic behavior is important in this
industry, particularly through behavior with regard to the land market and residential
development strategies.
2.6 Conclusion
Along the years, various empirical studies have been undertaken. Although there are some
studies using cross section or panel data sets for metropolitan areas, the great majority
of the studies use aggregated time series data. In spite of the di¤erences regarding the
type of data and econometric estimation methods, the main results are quite consistent
across studies.
Excluding some earlier studies like Muth (1960) and Follain (1979), we can reject a
perfectly elastic supply of housing. Most studies nd an elastic housing supply but there
are some studies that obtain below unit elasticities. The studies that distinguish between
short run and long run elasticities reveal that price elasticity of housing supply is lower in
the short run. Moreover, the studies that allow comparisons across countries or regions
show that there are signicant di¤erences in supply elasticities between countries and
regions. For instance, the values of the price elasticity of supply are higher in USA than
in the UK.
Regarding the other determinants of housing supply, most empirical results are ac-
cording to the theoretical predictions. For instance, nancial costs, ination and sales
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delay inuence negatively the housing supply. However there are also some results which
are unexpected, namely the inconclusive results with respect to the impact of construction
costs. One possible explanation for this inconclusive results is the di¢ culty in measuring
accurately the construction costs.
Our review on the articles that use game theory/ industrial organization models of
housing supply shows that the strategic interaction between land developers or construc-
tors is still understudied and hence there is a lot of potential in exploring this type of
models.
We believe that there is a need to increase our understanding of the behavior of con-
structors and land developers. This deeper understanding can come from the development
of theoretical models predicting their decisions in a context where there exists strategic
interactions between land developers and the estimation of empirical models based on mi-
cro data. Strategic interaction models of housing supply may allow us to understand how
land developers make their decisions regarding the house location and house quality, may
allow us to explore the market structure of the housing market and test if the market is
competitive or if the land developers have some oligopolistic power. By using data where
the unit of analysis is the land developer, we may be able to resolve some contra-intuitive
results such as those obtained with respect to the impact of construction costs.
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Chapter 3
Duopoly price competition in the
housing market
3.1 Introduction
The vast majority of the literature on housing markets assumes that the housing industry
is perfectly competitive, with a few exceptions like Arnott (1987), Arnott and Igarashi
(2000) and Baudewyns (2000). However the existence of di¤erences in the housing quality,
di¤erences in housing accessibility, di¤erences in households tastes, just to mention a few,
can be sources of market power and lead to strategic interactions between the urban land
developers (ULD).
This chapter and the next one apply game theory and industrial organization tools to
model housing supply. In these two chapters we discuss a dynamic duopoly game with
two stages. In the rst stage, the two ULD simultaneously choose the quality of housing
and, in the second stage, the ULD simultaneously choose prices. We assume that one
of the urban land developers is located at the central business district (CBD) while the
other is located at a more peripheral area.
Our model is naturally related to the vertical di¤erentiation literature. Our model
assumes that a quality improvement has xed costs but it also increases the marginal
27
production costs. Thus a quality improvement has cost implications both for the price-
stage game as well as for the quality-stage game. This is a contribution to the literature
on vertical di¤erentiation, since none of the existent studies incorporates simultaneously
these two types of costs of increasing quality. Moreover, our study is more complete than
most in the literature because we study whether in the subgame perfect equilibrium there
is partial coverage of the market or full coverage of the market (instead of assuming one
or the other).
In this chapter the emphasis is on the second stage price competition game, considering
the quality levels as given. We compute analytically the Nash equilibrium of the price
game for many possible combinations of the qualities of the two urban land developers.
Our analysis covers cases where both urban land developers operate (with full or with
partial coverage) as well as cases where only one of the ULD operates (again, with full
or partial coverage). Next we characterize the type of equilibrium obtained, using a
numerical analysis. Chapter 4 completes the analysis of our model by looking at the
choice of the quality levels in the rst stage, for various parameters values.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present a literature review
on vertical di¤erentiation. Section 3 describes the model. In section 4, we start by
imposing the necessary conditions on the two ULD quality levels, such that, their demand
is positive, this permits to restrict our analysis of the Nash equilibrium, for cases where at
least one ULD has positive demand. In this section we dene also some cut-o¤ valuations
that permit us to simplify the exposition. In section 5 we study the Nash equilibrium of the
price game, obtaining analytically the equilibrium prices for the second stage, assuming
given quality levels, considering all the cases that can occur. In section 6 we perform
numerical analysis to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price game. For each
quality levels, we compute the equilibrium prices, prot and type of equilibria. Finally,
section 7 summarizes our main conclusions of the chapter.
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3.2 Literature review on vertical di¤erentiation
There is a wide literature in industrial economics about vertical product di¤erentiation,
including models with endogenous quality choice. However most of the literature that we
have reviewed consists of general theoretical models, that do not take into account the
specicities of the housing market. In particular, one feature that is important in the
housing market is the location. In addition, di¤erences in quality are likely to a¤ect the
marginal production costs. These characteristics are taken into account in our model.
The literature on vertical product di¤erentiation models, specically with endogenous
quality choice, can be divided according to the assumption that is made about the nature
of the costs of quality improvement. As Motta (1993) explains, some authors like Shaked
and Sutton (1982), Bonanno (1986), Aoki and Prusa (1997), Lehman-Grube (1997) or
Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) assume that there are xed costs of quality improvement
while variable costs do not change with quality. This assumption is reasonable when pro-
ducers improve quality by advertising or by research and development. The authors that
assume variable costs of quality improvement like Mussa and Rosen (1978) or Lambertini
and Tedeschi (2007a) argue that higher quality requires more expensive inputs or a more
specialized labour force. Motta (1993) compares the two assumptions about the nature
of the costs of quality improvement in the same vertical product di¤erentiation model.
He concludes that in both cases di¤erentiation always exists at equilibrium. The author
states that rms choose to di¤erentiate products in the rst stage in order to smooth the
competition on prices in the second stage.
Shaked and Sutton (1982) is one of the earliest studies about how product di¤erentia-
tion relaxes price competition. In their model with three stages, rst rms choose to enter
or not in the industry, second the rms choose the quality of the product and, in the third
stage of the game, rms compete in prices. They conclude that when there are two rms
in the market, they choose to di¤erentiate the product, and the two rms have positive
prot at equilibrium, as the qualities are closer there is more competition in prices and
the prots get smaller for both rms. They also conclude that, if there are more than
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two rms in the market, all the rms choose the maximum level of quality possible and
prots become zero. They state that when a small cost of entry is introduced, the only
perfect equilibrium in the game is the one in which two rms enter in the market, in this
case, they di¤erentiate the product and have positive prots.
Aoki and Prusa (1997) consider a vertical quality di¤erentiation model, where they
analyze the e¤ect of the timing of investment decisions on the levels of quality chosen
by producers. The authors compare sequential with simultaneous quality decisions, and
they conclude that sequential choice of quality drives both rms to make smaller quality
investments than they would make if their decisions were simultaneous. They assume
that marginal cost of production is zero, but they state that if the marginal production
cost depends on quality, and if with quality improvement the marginal production costs
increases a lot then such quality improvements should not be undertaken.
Lambertini (1999) also discusses the timing and the choice of quality in a di¤erentiated
oligopoly. The author extends the work of Aoki and Prusa (1997) assuming that quality
improvements has xed costs.
Lambertini and Tedeshi (2007b) studied a market of vertically di¤erentiated goods
with sequential entry. Firms enter in the market after having developed innovations
that imply di¤erent quality levels. They conclude that the time and quality dimensions
interact in the formation of the industry. They also conclude that by imposing quality
improvements on later entrants implies the persistence of monopoly, and that when a
second innovator is allowed to produce an inferior quality good and the patent protection
is not too long then emerges a duopoly equilibrium.
Lambertini and Tedeschi (2007a) in a two period duopoly model of vertical product
di¤erentiation, proves that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the
rst entrant o¤ers a lower quality good and gains higher prots than the last entrant, he
also proves that this sequential entry is socially e¢ cient. In a more recent article, in the
same eld, Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) assumes partial market coverage and xed
costs of increasing quality.
Aoki (2003) analyses the e¤ect of credible quality investment, comparing Bertrand
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and Cournot competition. The author concludes that with Bertrand competition the
equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment and the competition is softer
while with Cournot competition the equilibrium qualities are higher.
Liao (2008) analyses the issue of market coverage in a vertical di¤erentiation model
with xed costs. He nds out that a covered market with an interior solution in the price
stage is not a Nash equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, Baudewyns (2000) is the only paper that considers
vertical di¤erentiation among land developers. The paper analyzes the decisions made
by two land developers that decide independently two variables: price and quality. He
assumes that one rm is at the CBD and builds houses in this location while the other
builds both in the CBD and in a more decentralized location. He considers a rst stage
in which the duopolists choose the level of housing quality, where the quality is dened
as a function of accessibility and housing quality. In the second stage, the two rms
simultaneously compete in prices. The author concludes that the decentralized developer
can adopt two kinds of strategies depending on the distance and the anticipated level of
quality at the CBD. If the centralized land developer o¤ers high quality apartments, then
the decentralized developer o¤ers low-quality housing units in the CBD, the idea of the
decentralized developer is to di¤erentiate its residential quality to soften price competition
in the second stage. In the suburban areas, it o¤ers a higher quality of housing but the
residential quality is lower, because of the transportation costs.
3.3 The model
Let us consider a standard model of vertical di¤erentiation. There are two urban land
developers indexed by i = 1; 2. The rst urban land developer (ULD 1) stays at the
CBD while the second urban land developer (ULD 2) builds houses at a more peripheral
location. In the rst stage, each ULD decides the quality of its houses. In the second
stage of the game, each ULD decides its housing price.
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The consumer net utility if he buys a house1 from urban developer i, is given by:
U = ki   tdi   pi
where ki represents the quality of the house sold by developer i and pi is the corresponding
price. The parameter  is a taste parameter that reects how much the consumer values
quality. This parameter is uniformly distributed across the population between  and
 =  + 1,  2 [;  + 1] which implies that the density function is equal to 1. Finally, di
is the distance from the urban developer is house to the central business district (CBD)
and t is the transportation cost by unit of distance. Since the ULD 1 is located at the
CBD, d1 = 0. For simplicity we assume that d2 = 1.
It should be noted that when a consumer buys a house he is also choosing his own
location (where he wants to live). If we assume that jobs and shops are located in the
CBD (like in the traditional monocentric city model), a consumer who buys a house in a
peripheral location has to move whenever he goes to work or shopping, which explains the
inclusion of the transportation cost in the utility function. On the contrary, a consumer
who buys a house in the CBD (from ULD 1) does not incur transportation costs.
Considering the location of the two urban land developers, the net utility of the con-
sumer is: 8>>><>>>:
k1   p1 if he buys from ULD 1
k2   t  p2 if he buys from ULD 2
0 if he does not buy
Among these three options, the consumer chooses the alternative that gives him the
highest net utility. Note that the two ULD are not in a symmetric position, unless the
transportation costs are nil. For positive transportation costs, if the two ULD o¤er the
same quality and the same price, the consumer prefers ULD 1 house to ULD 2 house.
On the other hand, when t = 0, our model is similar to the traditional model of vertical
product di¤erentiation.
1Thus we are assuming that each consumer has a unit demand.
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This is a two-stage dynamic game with imperfect information. In the rst stage
the duopolists simultaneously choose the quality of housing and in the second stage they
simultaneously choose prices. In the price game, we assume that the urban land developers
have constant marginal production costs that depend on the quality chosen in the rst
stage. That is the production costs are given by:
C(qi) =
k2i
2
 qi
where qi is the quantity of houses produced.
In addition, we assume that in the rst stage of the game there is an investment cost
of quality given by:
I(ki) =
8<: 0 if ki = 0F if ki > 0
where F is a positive constant.2
In order to nd the subgame perfect equilibrium, as we have a two stage game, we
need to nd rst the Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the game (the simultaneous
choice of prices), then go back to the rst stage and nd the solution of the complete
game.
In section 3.5 we analyze the equilibrium in the second stage game, considering the
housing quality of the two ULD as given. The Nash equilibrium of the game depends
on the vector of qualities (k1; k2) chosen in the rst stage of the game. If the game was
symmetric we could, without loss of generality, assume that k1  k2 and compute the cor-
responding Nash equilibria, knowing that if the assumption was the reverse one we would
have similar equilibria but with the roles of the two rms reversed. However, when the
transportation costs are positive, our model is not symmetric (ULD 2 has a disadvantage
because it is not located in the CBD). Thus, in our model it is important to explore the
2This assumption is not relevant for the second stage of the game but inuences the determination of
the equilibrium qualities in the rst stage. The numerical solution presented in the next chapter could be
changed easily to study other functional forms of the investment cost function. However time constraints
did not allow us to explore the implications of other assumptions.
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cases where k1 > k2, k1 = k2 and k2 > k1. In all these cases we may have di¤erent types
of equilibrium, depending on the housing quality di¤erence, the transportation cost and
on the quality taste parameter, . In particular, we may have cases where only one rm
operates (with partial or full coverage) and cases where both rms operate (with partial
or full coverage). Before we compute the Nash equilibrium it is useful to derive some
preliminary results.
3.4 Some preliminary results
We start by imposing necessary conditions on the two ULD quality levels for their demand
to be positive. This allows us to restrict our analysis of the Nash equilibrium for vector of
qualities (k1; k2) where at least one of the ULD has positive demand. Moreover, in order
to simplify the exposition it is also useful to dene some cut-o¤ valuations.
3.4.1 Necessary conditions for demand to be positive
A necessary condition for ULD 1 to have positive demand is that the consumer with the
highest quality valuation,  =  + 1, has a positive net utility if he buys from ULD 1 at
a price equal to its marginal cost, p1 = c1. In other words:
( + 1)k1   k
2
1
2
> 0
which is equivalent to:
k1 < 2( + 1): (3.1)
If k1 is equal or greater than 2( + 1), ULD 1 has zero demand even if it charges a
price equal to its marginal cost. What happens is that for k1 > 2( + 1), quality is too
high. Since the marginal costs of production are increasing with quality, for those levels
of quality the marginal cost of production is so high that even the consumer who values
most quality would prefer not to buy than to buy the house.
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Similarly, a necessary condition for ULD 2 to have a positive demand, is that the
consumer with the highest quality valuation,  =  + 1, has a positive net utility if he
buys from ULD 2 at a price equal to the marginal cost, p2 = c2. In other words:
( + 1)k2   t  k
2
2
2
> 0:
Since the second order derivative with respect to k2 is negative, we have an inverted
parabola, which means that the expression is positive between the roots of the quadratic
equation:
( + 1)k2   t  k
2
2
2
= 0:
The intuition is that, if the quality, k2, is too low no one wants to buy the house from ULD
2 for a price equal to the marginal cost due to the transportation costs. If the quality is
too high, it also happens that no one wants to buy because the corresponding price would
be too high, even if the price was equal to the marginal cost. Thus, in order for ULD 2
to have a positive demand, its quality must satisfy the following condition :
( + 1)  2
p
( + 1)2   2t < k2 < ( + 1) + 2
p
( + 1)2   2t (3.2)
In order to have real roots, the radicand must be positive. Therefore ( + 1)2   2t > 0,
or equivalently:
t  ( + 1)
2
2
:
Thus, in order for ULD 2 to have a positive demand, the transportation costs cannot be
too high with respect to the highest quality valuation, +1. Otherwise, even the highest
valuation consumer would prefer not to buy than to buy a house from ULD 2. In what
follows we restrict the analysis to the case where t  (+1)2
2
, since otherwise we would
never have a duopoly.
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3.4.2 Some important cut-o¤valuations and preliminary results
The consumers choice between buying from ULD 1 or not buying depends on whether
buying from ULD 1 gives the consumer a positive net utility or not. The consumer prefers
to buy from ULD 1 than not buy, if and only if:
U1() = k1   p1  0
Let b1 be the quality valuation of the consumer for which the previous condition is satised
in equality. In other words: b1 = p1
k1
: (3.3)
The consumer with valuation b1 is indi¤erent between buying from ULD 1 or not buying
at all. Note that all consumers with  > b1 strictly prefer to buy from ULD 1 than not
to buy, whereas all consumers with  < b1 prefer not buy than to buy from ULD 1.
Depending on k1 and p1, b1 may be below , between  and  +1 or above  +1. Ifb1 <  then all the consumers prefer to buy from ULD 1 than not buy, which means that
all consumers are served. On the contrary, if b1 >  +1, none of the consumers wants to
buy from ULD 1.
Similarly, one can nd the consumers who prefer to buy from ULD 2 than not buying,
by solving:
U2() = k2   t  p2  0
Let b2 be the indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 2 or not buying at all. In
other words: b2 = p2 + t
k2
: (3.4)
Again the consumers with valuations above b2 strictly prefer to buy from ULD 2 than not
buying. Depending on k2; t and p2, b2 may be below , between  and  +1 or above  +1.
If b2 <  then all the consumers prefer to buy from ULD 2 than not buy, which means
that all consumers are served. On the contrary, if b2 >  +1, none of the consumers wants
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to buy from ULD 2.
Figure 3.1 shows the utility of buying a house from ULD 1 (in the left) and from ULD
2 (in the right) in a case where some lower valuation consumers prefer not to buy any of
the houses, and thus the indi¤erent consumers, b1 and b2, are above . From the gure
it is clear that all consumers to the right of bi strictly prefer to buy a house from ULD i
than not to buy a house whereas all consumers to the left of bi strictly prefers not to buy
a house from ULD i.
q+1 q+1
( +1) -q k p1 1 ( +1) - -q k t p2 2
q
q
U k p1 1 1( ) =q q -
U2( )q = q - -k t p2 2
Figure 3.1: The indi¤erent consumer between buying and not buying from ULD 1 and
from ULD 2, respectively.
Note that the slope of the utility function of buying from ULD i is equal to ki and
therefore for positive qualities the utility is increasing with . This has implications on
the way the consumers choose between the two ULD. Some results are easy to show:
Lemma 3.1 If the highest valuation consumer,  + 1, prefers the house with the lower
quality, then all the consumers prefer the house of lower quality.
Proof. Assume that k2 > k1, the di¤erence in utilities, U1()   U2(), for type  is
positive if (k1   p1)  (k2   t  p2) > 0, or equivalently, p2+ t  p1 >  (k2   k1). Since
the right hand side of the previous expression is increasing with , that implies that if the
condition holds for ( + 1) then it holds for any  <  + 1. A similar proof holds in the
case of k1 > k2.
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A similar results holds when the lower valuation consumer prefers the high quality
house:
Lemma 3.2 If the lowest valuation consumer, , prefers the house with the higher quality,
then all the consumers prefer the house of higher quality.
Proof. Assume that k2 > k1, the di¤erence in utilities U2()   U1() for type  is
positive if (k2   t  p2)  (k1   p1) > 0, or equivalently, p2+ t  p1 <  (k2   k1). Since
the right hand side of the previous expression is increasing with , that implies that if
the condition holds for  then it holds for any  > . A similar proof holds in the case of
k1 > k2.
The proofs show that, for a given quality di¤erential, the consumer decision depends
on the di¤erence between the total prices, p2 + t   p1, where p2 + t is the total price of
rm 2 and p1 is the total price of rm 1. Note that, in the two previous cases, only one
of the ULD has positive demand.
In order for both rms to have positive demand, the price di¤erential cannot be too
high since otherwise all consumers would prefer the low quality house. On the other hand
the price di¤erential cannot be too low, otherwise all the consumers would prefer the high
quality house.
Lemma 3.3 If prices are such that both ULD have positive demand, the higher quality
ULD serves the higher valuation consumers whereas the lower quality ULD serves the
lower valuation consumers.
Proof. Assume that k2 > k1, then from lemma 3.1 we know that ULD 2 can only
have positive demand if the highest valuation consumer prefers the higher quality house.
Moreover, from lemma 3.2 we know that ULD 1 can only have positive demand if the
lowest valuation consumer prefers the lower quality house. This implies that U2()  
U1() = (k2   t  p2) (k1   p1) is negative at  but positive at +1. Since the function
is continuous in , there exists an intermediate value of , , where (k2   t  p2)  
(k1   p1) = 0. Moreover since U2  U1 is increasing in , then all consumers to the right
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of  prefer to buy the house from ULD 2, whereas all consumers to the left of  prefer
to buy from ULD 1. A similar proof holds in the case where k1 > k2.
This shows that we can never have two local monopolies. Either only the high quality
ULD operates, only the low quality ULD operates, or both ULD operate.
The consumer choice between the two urban lands developers depends on whether
k1 = k2, k1 > k2 or k2 > k1. If the two ULD have the same quality, the utility functions
of buying from the two ULD have the same slope and either ULD 1 is strictly preferred to
ULD 2 for all consumers, or the reverse, or all consumers are indi¤erent between buying
from ULD 1 and buying from ULD 2.
When k2 > k1, consumers prefer to buy from ULD 1 than from ULD 2 if:
k1   p1  k2   t  p2
which is equivalent to:
  p2   p1 + t
k2   k1
Let  be the value of  such that previous expression holds in equality:
 =
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1
In other words,  is the indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 1 or buying from
ULD 2. The consumers to the right of  strictly prefer to buy from ULD 2 whereas the
consumers to the left of  strictly prefer to buy from ULD1 than from ULD2. Therefore,
the higher valuation consumers buy from the higher quality ULD while the lower valuation
consumers buy from the lower quality ULD.
Similarly, when k1 > k2, consumers prefer to buy from ULD 1 than from ULD 2 if:
k1   p1  k2   t  p2
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which is equivalent to:
  p1   p2   t
k1   k2
Let  be the value of  such that previous expression holds in equality, in other words
 is the indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 1 or buying from ULD 2. The
consumers to the right of  strictly prefer to buy from ULD 1 whereas the consumers to
the left of  strictly prefer to buy from ULD2 than from ULD1. Therefore, the higher
valuation consumers buy from the higher quality ULDwhile the lower valuation consumers
buy from the lower quality ULD.
q+1 q+1
( +1) -q k p1 1
( +1) -q k p1 1( +1) - -q k t p2 2
( +1) - -q k t p2 2
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q2 q1
Figure 3.2: The indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 1 and ULD 2 when
k2 > k1 (left) and when k1 > k2 (right).
Using the results in this section and the previous one, it is relatively easy, although
slightly boring, to derive the demand functions when k2 = k1, when k2 > k1 and when
k1 > k2. The detailed calculations are presented in Appendix A - Demand functions.
3.5 Nash equilibrium of the price game
Considering that any price below the marginal cost is weakly dominated by charging a
price equal to marginal cost, to derive the Nash equilibrium we restrict the analysis to
prices pi  ci. To organize our results, it is helpful to think about the maximum utility
that a rm could o¤er to the consumers, without charging a price below marginal cost.
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Figure 3.3: The ULD prot represented as the di¤erence between the maximal surplus of
rm i and the surplus at pi
This maximal surplus is given by:
U1() = k1   k
2
1
2
and U2() = k2   t  k
2
2
2
An interesting result is:
Lemma 3.4 If ULD i serves consumer with valuation , the prot obtained with this
consumer is given by U i()  Ui().
Proof. Consider ULD 1, U1()  U1() = k1   k
2
1
2
  (k1   p1) = p1   k
2
1
2
= p1   c1.
A similar proof can be done for ULD 2.
This results allows us to get a nice representation of the prot obtained by the ULD
i, since it will be given by the area between U i() and Ui() in the market area of ULD i.
Moreover this result also helps organizing the presentation of the Nash equilibrium as
that will depend on which rm o¤ers a higher quality but it will also depend on which
rm (if any) has a natural advantage in terms of the maximum surplus it can o¤er. In
particular, if the maximum surplus a rm can o¤er is always non-positive, the rm has
zero demand as long as pi  ci. In this case the other rm has a guaranteed monopoly
position. It is also possible that the maximum surplus that one ULD can o¤er is always
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above the maximal surplus that the other ULD can o¤er. In this case, the rm with
higher maximal surplus has the possibility of being a monopolist by charging a price low
enough so that for the other ULD is not protable to build any house. However the ULD
that has a «natural advantage» may prefer to charge a higher price and share the market
with the other ULD (it all depends on which of these options is more protable). Finally,
it is also possible that when we look at the maximal surplus o¤ered by each ULD, both
rms have a «natural market» . In this case, both rms will operate in equilibrium.
Another interesting conclusion that follows from the analysis of the maximum surplus
expression, U i(); is that it is a quadratic function with a maximum at ki = . In other
words, increasing quality above  has a negative impact on the maximum surplus that
can be o¤ered to the consumer with valuation . Thus choosing a quality above +1
decreases the maximum surplus that can be o¤ered to all the consumers and hence it is
detrimental in terms of the rm potential demand.
3.5.1 One of the ULD has a guaranteed monopoly
Firm 1 has a guaranteed monopoly
As explained in section 3.4.1 no consumer will ever buy from rm 2 if k2 is outside the
limits in expression (3.2). In this case, if k1 < 2(+1) rm 1 has a guaranteed monopoly.
If ULD 1 operates in the market with partial coverage, its demand is given by all the
consumers above b1. Figure 3.4 illustrates this case.
ULD 1 Demand
q+1q
Figure 3.4: Only ULD 1 operates with partial coverage.
ULD 1 solves the following problem:
max
p1
1 =

 + 1  p1
k1

(p1   c1) subject to p1  k1
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If we solve the unconstrained problem, the rst order condition is
d1
dp1
=  p1   c1
k1
+  + 1  p1
k1
= 0
Solving with respect to p1, we obtain:
p1 =
c1 + k1( + 1)
2
(3.5)
If the previous price is equal or above k1, then p1 is the equilibrium price. Otherwise
ULD 1 covers the whole market and it solves:
max
p1
1 = (p1   c1) subject to p1  k1
Since the prot function increases linearly with p1, it is optimal to charge the highest
price possible. That is, with full coverage, p1 = k1.
Therefore, the equilibrium price of ULD 1 when it has a guaranteed monopoly is:
Proposition 3.5 If k2 < (+ 1)  2
p
( + 1)2   2t or k2 > (+ 1) + 2
p
( + 1)2   2t and
k1 < 2( + 1), ULD 1 has a guaranteed monopoly and its optimal price is:
p1 = max
"
k1;
k21
2
+ k1( + 1)
2
#
The market is partially covered whenever   1 or when  > 1 and k1 > 2( 1). If  > 1
and k1 < 2(   1) the market is fully covered.
Proof. The rst part of the proof is an immediate consequence of ULD 1 prot
maximization problem and from the substitution of c1 =
k21
2
in expression (3.5). The
second part of the proof follows from the comparison between terms in the maximum
function. The condition
k21
2
+ k1( + 1)
2
> k1 , k1 (k1 + 2(1  )) > 0
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which holds for every k1 > 0 when   1 and it also holds for k1 > 2(   1) for  > 1.
Obviously, the reverse condition holds for  > 1 and k1 < 2(   1).
The intuition for this result is that when the lowest valuation consumer has a very low
valuation of quality, the monopolist is better o¤ by not covering the whole market, since
full coverage would imply a too low price (in the limit case of  = 0, the price would have
to be 0 to have full coverage). On the other hand, when the lowest valuation consumer is
high, the monopolist is also better o¤ covering only partially the market if the quality is
very high. The reason is that, for a high quality the marginal production costs are also
very high, which implies very high prices. But then the lower valuation consumers do not
want to buy and hence the market is not fully covered.
The previous results also tells us that the monopolist ULD 1 only covers the market
completely for higher valuations and not too high quality.
If ULD 1 has a guaranteed monopoly, its price is increasing with its quality. It increases
linearly when the market is fully covered. It increases at an increasing rate if the market
is only partially covered (due to the shape of marginal costs). Moreover the optimal price
does not depend on t because the demand of ULD 1 is not a function of t.
Firm 2 has a guaranteed monopoly
As we can see in section 3.4.1, ULD 1 has zero demand if k1 > 2( + 1). In this case,
ULD 2 has a guaranteed monopoly as long as k2 satises condition (3.2). If the market
is partially covered, the demand of ULD 2 is given by all the consumers above b2. Figure
3.5 illustrates this case.ULD 2 solves the following problem:
ULD 2 Demand
q+1q ^
Figure 3.5: Only ULD 2 operates with partial coverage.
max
p2
2 =

 + 1  p2 + t
k2

(p2   c2) subject to p2 > k2   t
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If we solve this problem ignoring the constraint, the rst order condition is:
d2
dp2
=  p2   c2
k2
+  + 1  p2 + t
k2
= 0
Then solving with respect to p2, we get:
p2 =
c2 + k2( + 1)  t
2
If the previous price is higher than k2  t, then p2 is the equilibrium price. Otherwise
ULD 2 covers the whole market in which case it wants to charge the highest price that
guarantees full coverage, thus
p2 = k2   t:
Therefore, the equilibrium price of ULD 2 when it has a guaranteed monopoly is:
Proposition 3.6 If k1  2( + 1) and ( + 1)   2
p
( + 1)2   2t < k2 < ( + 1) +
2
p
( + 1)2   2t then ULD 2 has a guaranteed monopoly and its optimal price is
p2 = max
"
k2   t;
k22
2
+ k2( + 1)  t
2
#
Proof. It is immediate from the solution of ULD 2 prot maximization problem.
The optimal price of ULD 2 when it has a guaranteed monopoly is an increasing
function of k2 (the intuition is the same than in the previous subsection). Moreover the
optimal price of rm 2 is decreasing with t. This last result is an immediate consequence
of t having a negative impact on the rm demand (if the market is partially covered) and
a negative impact on the price that can be charged to the lowest valuation consumer (if
the market is fully covered).
3.5.2 Case where k1 = k2
When k1 = k2 = k, the two ULD are o¤ering precisely the same quality, thus there is no
di¤erentiation and we have a traditional Bertrand model. However, if t > 0, ULD 2 has
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a disadvantage and the ULDs demand are discontinuous at p1 = p2 + t.
In the Nash equilibrium one cannot have p2 above c2 = k
2
2
or p1 above k
2
2
+ t, since if
that happened there would be an incentive for each rm to slightly undercut the price so
has to capture the whole demand.
If t = 0 the two ULD will share equally the market, but both have a zero operating
prot. This implies that if there are xed cost to improve quality, the ULD get a negative
payo¤ in the complete game. If t > 0, ULD 1 has an advantage over ULD 2 and will be
the only ULD operating in the market by selling at price below k
2
2
+ t. For t high, ULD 1
may be able to charge its optimal monopoly price (as long as this price is below k
2
2
+ t),
while for t small the constraint p1  k22 + t will be binding.
From section 3.5.1 we already know the optimal monopoly price of ULD 1 depending
on whether the market is fully covered or not. But now ULD 1 is constrained to charge a
price below k
2
2
+ t. For t high the constraint p1  k22 + t is not binding and either we get
full coverage or partial coverage according the result in section 3.5.1. On the other hand,
for t low the constraint is binding and ULD 1 will have to charge a lower price to match
the surplus o¤ered by ULD 2. Thus, for t low ULD 1 is a constrained monopoly (with
partial or full coverage).
Therefore when the two ULD o¤er the same quality the Nash equilibrium of the price
game is as follows:
Proposition 3.7 When k1 = k2 = k, if t = 0, then p1 = p

2 =
k2
2
. When t > 0, then
p2 =
k2
2
and
p1 = min
"
k2
2
+ t;max
"
k;
k2
2
+ k( + 1)
2
##
When t  k     k
2

the market is always fully covered and p1 =
k2
2
+ t. When t >
k
 
   k
2

,  > 1 and k1 < 2(   1); then the market is fully covered and p1 = k. If
t > k
 
   k
2

and either   1 or  > 1 and k1 > 2(  1), the market is partially covered
and p1 = min

k2
2
+k(+1)
2
; k
2
2
+ t

:
Proof. The rst part of the result follows from the solution of ULD 1 prot maxi-
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mization problem subject to the constraint p1  k22 + t. If the constraint is not binding
the ULD 1 optimal price as given in 3.5.1, otherwise p1 = k
2
2
+ t: If we have t  k     k
2

,
then k
2
2
+ t  k and therefore p1 = k
2
2
+ t. Since p1  k the market is fully covered.
When t > k
 
   k
2

, we have k
2
2
+t > k: If
k2
2
+k(+1)
2
 k then p1 = k and the market
is fully covered. This case holds for  > 1 and k1 < 2(   1). However if t > k
 
   k
2

and
k2
2
+k(+1)
2
> k the market is partially covered and p1 = min

k2
2
+k(+1)
2
; k
2
2
+ t

.
The previous result tells that when t is low, t  k     k
2

, ULD 1 covers the whole
market and charges p1 =
k2
2
+ t (in reality p1 has to be slightly below this). Consequently,
the prot is:
1 =
k2
2
+ t  c1 = k
2
2
+ t  k
2
2
= t
In this case, the lowest valuation consumer gets a positive surplus, the same surplus it
would be able to get buying from ULD 2 at p2 = k
2
2
.
For t high, t > k
 
   k
2

, the market will be totally covered for  > 1 and k1 < 2( 1)
at price p1 = k and the corresponding prot is:
1 = k   c1 = k  
k2
2
:
Note that in this case the lowest valuation consumer gets a zero surplus.
In the remaining cases the market will be partially covered. The consumers covered
may be the same than under unconstrained monopoly (for very high t), but for t not
too high, more consumers will be served due to existence of ULD 2 (when matching the
surplus o¤ered by ULD 2 is a binding constraint).
Looking at the equilibrium prices when k1 = k2 = k, one observes that the prices are
increasing with the quality and are increasing with t whenever the constraint p1  k
2
2
+t is
binding (that is for low t). For higher t the equilibrium prices depend only on the quality.
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3.5.3 Case where k2 > k1
Both ULDs have a «natural market»
Suppose that if ULD 2 charges p2 =
k22
2
and ULD 1 charges p1 =
k21
2
; then the highest
valuation consumer prefers to buy from ULD 2, while the lowest valuation consumer who
buys a house prefers to buy a house from ULD 1. In other words, suppose that U2()
and U1() intersect at some  between max
h
;b1(c1)i and ( + 1), where b1(c1) = k12 is
the indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 1 and not buying if this rm charges
p1 = c1. Then with marginal cost pricing both rms have a strictly positive demand. This
is illustrated in Figure 3.6. This case holds when the following conditions are both true:
q+1q
U2(q)
U1(q)
q (* c c1 2, )
«Natural market» of
of ULD 1 «Natural market» of ULD 2
Figure 3.6: The «natural markets» of ULD 1 and ULD 2.

( + 1)k2   t  k
2
2
2

 

( + 1)k1   k
2
1
2

> 0
and

max

;
k1
2
)

k2   t  k
2
2
2

 

max

;
k1
2

k1   k
2
1
2

< 0
which is equivalent to:
(k2   k1)

max

;
k1
2

  (k1 + k2)
2

< t < (k2   k1)

( + 1)  (k1 + k2)
2

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Note that if max

; k1
2

= k1
2
the left hand side limit is necessarily negative, and thus
only the right hand side limit is relevant. Intuitively t cannot be too high for both rms
to operate, since with t very high only rm 1 would operate. On the other hand, if
max

; k1
2

= , which happens for low levels of k1, k1 < 2, the left hand side limit may
be positive (if k2 is not very high) in which case for low values of t all consumers prefer
ULD 2. To summarize, when k2 > k1, the two rms operate if t is not too high and k1 is
not too low (and k2 is not very high).
Under this circunstances one can show the following:
Lemma 3.8 If (k2   k1)

max

; k1
2
  (k1+k2)
2

< t < (k2   k1)

( + 1)  (k1+k2)
2

, then
in equilibrium both rms operate.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that one of the ULDs does not operate in equi-
librium (let us assume it is ULD 1). If ULD 2 is charging a price above the marginal
cost, that would mean that some consumers would buy from ULD 1 if it charges a price
slightly above its marginal cost, which would imply a positive prot. Thus ULD 1 has an
incentive to deviate. On the other hand, if ULD 2 was charging p2  c2, this ULD would
gain by deviating to a price slightly above c2. Thus, if one of the rms was not operating,
at least one of them would gain by deviating. Hence in equilibrium one cannot have one
of the rms without operating.
When both rms operate in the market with full coverage, we already know that ULD
2 covers the consumer with higher valuation while the ULD 1 covers the consumers with
lower valuation as shown in Figure 3.7.The demands of the two ULD are given by:
                 ULD 2 Demand
q+1q
                 ULD 1 Demand
Figure 3.7: Both rms operate and the whole market is covered when k2 > k1.
D1 =
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1    and D2 =  + 1 
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1
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Then the prot functions for the two ULD are given by the following expressions:
1 =

p2   p1 + t
k2   k1   

(p1   c1)
2 =

 + 1  p2   p1 + t
k2   k1

(p2   c2)
The rst order conditions of the two ULD prot maximization problems are:
@1
@p1
=   p1   c1
k2   k1 +

p2   p1 + t
k2   k1   

= 0
@2
@p2
=   p2   c2
k2   k1 +

 + 1  p2   p1 + t
k2   k1

= 0
Solving this system with respect to p1 and p2, we obtain the equilibrium prices:
p
1
=
(1  ) (k2   k1) + 2c1 + c2 + t
3
p2 =
( + 2)(k2   k1) + 2c2 + c1   t
3
It should be noted that in order for this to be the equilibrium, we have to have
  (p1; p2)   + 1 (so that both rms operate) and the consumer with lowest quality
valuation, ; has to have a non-negative net utility buying the house of ULD 1 at price
p1. In other words, full coverage holds if:
k1 
(1  ) (k2   k1) + k21 + k
2
2
2
+ t
3
(3.6)
Note that for very low values of  the previous condition does not hold (it does not hold
for  and hence, by continuity it does not hold in a neighborhood of  = 0. Moreover, the
condition is easier to be satised for higher  (since the left hand side of the expression
is increasing and the right hand side is decreasing with ). The previous result can be
summarized as follows:
Proposition 3.9 When k2 > k1 and both ULD operate in equilibrium and there is full
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coverage, the equilibrium prices are:
p
1
=
(1  ) (k2   k1) + k21 + k
2
2
2
+ t
3
p2 =
( + 2)(k2   k1) + k22 + k
2
1
2
  t
3
Proof. It follows from the solution of the system of rst order conditions of the two
ULD prot maximization problems assuming full coverage and substituting ci by
k2i
2
.
The equilibrium prices depend on the quality di¤erential (k2   k1), depend on the
marginal costs which are a quadratic function of quality and depend on t. Note that the
shape of the equilibrium prices as a function of the qualities is inuenced a lot by the
shape of the marginal costs.
Under full coverage, increasing t inuences positively the equilibrium price of ULD
1 and negatively the equilibrium price of ULD 2. This happens because, increasing t
increases the demand of ULD 1 and decreases the demand of ULD 2. As a consequence
it is optimal for ULD 1 to charge a higher price (its best response shifts to the right)
whereas for ULD 2 it is optimal to decrease it price (its best response shifts down).
The impact of changes in the rm house quality on its own price is clearly positive for
the higher quality ULD. For the lower quality ULD the sign is positive if   1, but may
be negative otherwise.
If at the previous equilibrium prices, condition 3.6 does not hold, then it means that in
the Nash equilibrium we cannot have a duopoly with full coverage. Figure 3.8 illustrates
what happens if both rms operate with partial coverage.
                       ULD 2 Demand
q+1q
                             ULD 1 Demand
Figure 3.8: Both rms operate but the market is only partially covered when k2 > k1.
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Thus, if the equilibrium involves a duopoly with partial coverage demands are:
D1 =
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1  
p1
k1
and D2 =  + 1  p2   p1 + t
k2   k1
The prot functions for the two ULD are given by the following expressions:
1 =

p2   p1 + t
k2   k1  
p1
k1

(p1   c1)
2 =

 + 1  p2   p1 + t
k2   k1

(p2   c2)
The rst-order conditions of the two ULD prot maximization problems are:
@1
@p1
=   p1   c1
k2   k1  
p1   c1
k1
+
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1  
p1
k1
= 0
@2
@p2
=   p2   c2
k2   k1 +  + 1 
p2   p1 + t
k2   k1 = 0
Solving the system of equations with respect to p1 and p2, we obtain the equilibrium
prices:
p1 =
k1( + 1) (k2   k1) + 2c1k2 + c2k1 + tk1
4k2   k1
p2 =
2k2( + 1) (k2   k1) + c1k2 + 2c2k2   t (2k2   k1)
4k2   k1
In order for this to be a Nash equilibrium it has to happen that, considering the
equilibrium price p1, the indi¤erent consumer between buying from ULD 1 and not buying,
^1(p

1), is between  and 
(p1; p

2) and that 
(p1; p

2) is smaller than (+1), since otherwise
all the consumers would prefer ULD 1.
Therefore if both ULD operate with partial coverage, the equilibrium is as follows:
Proposition 3.10 When k2 > k1 and both ULD operate in equilibrium and there is
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partial coverage, the equilibrium prices are:
p1 =
k1( + 1) (k2   k1) + k21k2 + 0:5k22k1 + tk1
4k2   k1
p2 =
2k2( + 1) (k2   k1) + 0:5k21k2 + k32   t (2k2   k1)
4k2   k1
Proof. It follows from the solution of the system of rst order conditions of the two
ULD prot maximization problems assuming partial coverage and substituting ci by
k2i
2
.
ULD 2 has a natural advantage
ULD 2 has a natural advantage if U2() > U1() for all consumers who buy a house at
marginal cost pricing. This is illustrated in Figure 3.9. ULD 2 has a natural advantage
q+1qq+1
qk c t2 2- -
qk c1 1-
q
U2(q)
U2(q)
U1(q)
U1(q)
Figure 3.9: ULD 2 has a «natural advantage» and can be a monopolist.
if:
U2()  U1() =

k2   t  k
2
2
2

 

k1   k
2
1
2

> 0 for all   max
h
;b1(c1)i
which is equivalent to:
1
2
(k2   k1) (2   (k1 + k2)) > t for all   max
h
;b1(c1)i
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Note that for this condition to hold the sum of the qualities cannot be too high, k1 +
k2 < 2max
h
;b1(c1)i. Moreover the condition is easier to be satised for higher quality
di¤erentials, i.e. higher k2   k1 (for a constant k1 + k2) and for smaller t.
When ULD 2 has a natural advantage, this rm can be a monopolist by charging a
price that guarantees consumers at least the same surplus they get from ULD 1 at price
p1 = c1. However such behavior may not be optimal if it implies a very low price since
ULD 2 may be better o¤ by charging a higher price, thus gaining a higher mark-up, even
if that implies loosing some customers to ULD 1. Intuitively, ULD 2 will only prefer
to be a monopolist if it has a very big advantage (U2() is much higher than U1()).
Otherwise sharing the market will be a better alternative and we obtain the equilibrium
prices derived in section 3.5.3.
From section 3.5.1 we already know the optimal price charged by ULD 2 if it was an
unconstrained monopoly. To be a monopolist, now ULD 2 maximizes its prot subject
to constraint that the lowest valuation consumer who buys a house, if he buys from ULD
2 gets a surplus at least as high as the surplus he would get from buying a house from
ULD 1. This surplus constraint can be written as follows:
max
h
;b1(c1)i k2 t p2  max h;b1(c1)i k1 c1 , p2  max h;b1(c1)i (k2   k1)+c1 t
If the lowest valuation consumer, , gets a positive surplus if he buys from ULD 1
at p1 = c1, b1(c1)  , then in order to be a monopolist ULD 2 has to cover the whole
market and o¤er consumer  at least the same surplus he would get from ULD 1. This
case is illustrate in the left side of Figure 3.9. The surplus constraint is given by:
k2   t  p2  k1   c1 , p2   (k2   k1) + c1   t
Thus, in this case p2 =  (k2   k1) + c1   t.
On the other hand, if b1(c1) >  (illustrated in the right side of Figure 3.9), the surplus
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constraint is given by:
b1(c1)k2   t  p2  b1(c1)k1   c1 , p2  c1k2
k1
  t
In this case, ULD 2 can be a monopolist covering the whole market or not, depending on
which of these alternatives is most protable. If the market is fully covered, the constraint
is not binding and the price is p2 = k2 t. If the market is partially covered the constraint
may or not be binding and the price is p2 = min
h
c1
k2
k1
  t; c2+k2(+1) t
2
i
.
To summarize, if ULD 2 has a natural advantage, and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
Proposition 3.11 If ULD 2 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
p2 = min
"
max

;
k1
2

(k2   k1) + c1   t;max
"
k2   t;
k22
2
+ k2( + 1)  t
2
##
Proof. It follows from the solution of the constrained prot maximization problem
of ULD 2. If solving the unconstrained problem p2 is lower or equal than the upper limit
imposed by the constraint, then ULD 2 can behave as an unconstrained monopoly and p2
is as given in section 3.5.1. If the unconstrained optimal price does not satisfy the surplus
constraint, then the constraint is binding and p2 = max

; k1
2

(k2   k1) + c1.
However, when the constraint is binding, ULD 2 may be better o¤ by not being
a monopolist since that position is achieved only by charging a lower price than the
monopolist would wish. When that happens the equilibrium prices will be the ones given
in section 3.5.3.
ULD 1 has a natural advantage
ULD 1 is o¤ering the lower quality house. We know that if the highest valuation consumer
prefers to buy fromULD 1, then everyone else also prefers to buy fromULD 1. Considering
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this, if U1(+ 1) > U2(+ 1), ULD 1 has a natural advantage. This case is illustrated in
Figure 3.10.
q+1qq+1
( +1) -q k c1 1
( +1) -q k c2 2-t
q
U2(q) U2(q)
U1(q) U1(q)
Figure 3.10: ULD 1 has a «natural advantage» and can be a monopolist.
This scenario holds when:

( + 1)k1   k
2
1
2

 

( + 1)k2   t  k
2
2
2

> 0
which is equivalent to
(k2   k1)

1
2
(k1 + k2)  ( + 1)

+ t > 0
Note that a su¢ cient condition (but not necessary) for the previous expression to hold is
k1 + k2 > 2( + 1). Thus this case is more likely to hold when the sum of the qualities is
high and when the quality di¤erential is also high.
From section 3.5.1 we already know the optimal price charged by ULD 1 if it was an
unconstrained monopoly. To be a monopolist, now ULD 1 maximizes its prot subject
to constraint that the highest valuation consumer gets a higher surplus if he buys from
ULD 1 than if he buys ULD 2 at p2 = c2. In other words, the surplus constraint is:
( + 1)k1   p1  ( + 1)k2   t  c2 , p1  c2 + t  ( + 1) (k2   k1)
If the previous constraint is satised when we solve the unconstrained problem of prot
maximization, the optimal price of ULD 1 is the one given in section 3.5.1. Otherwise
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the surplus constraint is binding, and to be a monopolist, ULD has to charge p1 =
c2 + t  ( + 1) (k2   k1).
To summarize, if ULD 1 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
Proposition 3.12 If ULD 1 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
p1 = min
"
k22
2
+ t  ( + 1) (k2   k1) ;max
"
k1;
k21
2
+ k1( + 1)
2
##
Proof. It follows from the solution of the constrained prot maximization problem of
ULD 1 and the result in section 3.5.1.
If the optimal monopoly price is such that the surplus constraint is binding, ULD 1
may be better o¤ by not decreasing the price so much and share the market with ULD 2.
In that case, the equilibrium prices will be the ones presented in section 3.5.3.
3.5.4 Case where k1 > k2
Both ULDs have a «natural market»
Now ULD 1 is o¤ering the higher quality house. Therefore, if both rms operate, ULD
1 serves the higher valuation consumers while ULD 2 serves the lower valuation ones.
Similarly to section 3.5.3, we can show that if U1() and U2() intersect at some  between
max
h
;b2(c2)i and (+1), where b2(c2) is the indi¤erent consumer between buying from
ULD 2 and not buying if this rm charges p2 = c2, then with marginal cost pricing both
rms have a strictly positive demand and in equilibrium both rms operate.
If both ULD operate and the market is fully covered, consumers with   are served
by ULD 2 whereas consumers with    are served by ULD 1 (see Figure 3.11).
Hence the demands of the two ULD are given by:
D1 =  + 1  p1   p2   t
k1   k2 and D2 =
p1   p2   t
k1   k2   
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                 ULD 1 Demand
q+1q
                 ULD 2 Demand
Figure 3.11: Both ULD operate and cover the whole market when k1 > k2.
Thus the prot functions for the two ULD are given by the following expressions:
1 =

 + 1  p1   p2   t
k1   k2

(p1   c1)
2 =

p1   p2   t
k1   k2   

(p2   c2)
The rst order conditions of the prot maximization problems are:
@1
@p1
=   p1   c1
k1   k2 +  + 1 
p1   p2   t
k1   k2 = 0
@2
@p2
=   p2   c2
k1   k2 +
p1   p2   t
k1   k2    = 0
Solving this system of equations with respect to p1 and p2 we obtain the equilibrium
prices:
p
1
=
( + 2)(k1   k2) + 2c1 + c2 + t
3
p2 =
(1  )(k1   k2) + 2c2 + c1   t
3
Consequently, when both rms operate with full coverage, the equilibrium is as follows:
Proposition 3.13 When k1 > k2 and both ULD operate in equilibrium and there is full
coverage, the equilibrium prices are:
p
1
=
( + 2)(k1   k2) + k21 + k
2
2
2
+ t
3
p2 =
(1  )(k1   k2) + k22 + k
2
1
2
  t
3
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Proof. It follows from the solution of the system of rst order conditions of the two
ULD prot maximization problems assuming full coverage and substituting ci by
k2i
2
.
It should be noted that in order for this to be the equilibrium, we have to have
     + 1 (so that both rms operate) and the consumer with lowest quality
valuation, ; has to have a non-negative net utility buying the house of ULD 2 at price
p2. If at the previous equilibrium prices the last condition does not hold, then it means
that in the Nash equilibrium we cannot have a duopoly with full coverage.
If the two ULD operate in the market with partial coverage, the lower valuation
consumers prefer not to buy the house and demands are as given in Figure 3.12.That is,
                       ULD 1 Demand
q+1q
                             ULD 2 Demand
Figure 3.12: Both ULD operate but the market is only partially covered when k1 > k2.
the demand functions are given by:
D1 =  + 1  p1   p2   t
k1   k2 and D2 =
p1   p2   t
k1   k2  
p2 + t
k2
And the prot functions are:
1 =

 + 1  p1   p2   t
k1   k2

(p1   c1)
2 =

p1   p2   t
k1   k2  
p2 + t
k2

(p2   c2)
The rst-order conditions are given by:
@1
@p1
=   p1   c1
k1   k2 +  + 1 
p1   p2   t
k1   k2 = 0
@2
@p2
=   p2   c2
k1   k2  
p2   c2
k2
+
p1   p2   t
k1   k2  
p2 + t
k2
= 0
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After we solve with respect to p1 and p2 we get the following equilibrium prices:
p
1
=
2k1( + 1)(k1   k2) + k1 (2c1 + c2 + t)
4k1   k2
p
2
=
k2( + 1)(k1   k2) + 2k1c2 + k2c1   t (2k1   k2)
4k1   k2
Therefore if both ULD operate with partial coverage, the equilibrium is as follows:
Proposition 3.14 When k1 > k2 and both ULD operate in equilibrium and there is
partial coverage, the equilibrium prices are:
p
1
=
2k1( + 1)(k1   k2) + k1

k21 +
k22
2
+ t

4k1   k2
p
2
=
k2( + 1)(k1   k2) + k1k22 + k2 k
2
1
2
  t (2k1   k2)
4k1   k2
Proof. It follows from the solution of the system of rst order conditions of the two
ULD prot maximization problems assuming partial coverage and substituting ci by
k2i
2
.
ULD 2 has a natural advantage
ULD 2 is o¤ering the lower quality house. We know that if the highest valuation consumers
prefers to buy fromULD 2, then everyone else also prefers to buy fromULD 2. Considering
this, if U2( + 1) > U1( + 1), then ULD 2 has a natural advantage.
From section 3.5.1 we already know the optimal price charged by ULD 2 if it was an
unconstrained monopoly. To be a monopolist, now ULD 2 maximizes its prot subject to
the surplus constraint is:
( + 1)k2   t  p2  ( + 1)k1   c1 , p2  c1   t  ( + 1) (k1   k2)
If the previous constraint is satised when we solve the unconstrained problem of
ULD 2 prot maximization, the optimal price of ULD 2 is the one given in section 3.5.1.
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Otherwise the surplus constraint is binding, and to be a monopolist, ULD 2 has to charge
p2 = c1   t  ( + 1) (k1   k2).
To summarize, if ULD 2 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal prices would be:
Proposition 3.15 If ULD 2 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
p2 = min
"
k21
2
  t  ( + 1) (k1   k2) ;max
"
k2   t;
k22
2
+ k2( + 1)  t
2
##
Proof. It follows from the solution of the constrained prot maximization problem of
ULD 2 and the result in section 3.5.1.
If the optimal monopoly price is such that the surplus constraint is binding, ULD 2
may be better o¤ by not decreasing the price so much and share the market with ULD 1.
In that case, the equilibrium prices will be the ones presented in section 3.5.4.
ULD 1 has a natural advantage
ULD 1 has a natural advantage if U1() > U2() for all consumers who buy a house at
marginal cost pricing. In other words, U1() > U2() for all   max
h
;b2(c2)i :
From section 3.5.1 we already know the optimal price charged by ULD 1 if it was an
unconstrained monopoly. To be a monopolist, now ULD 1 maximizes its prot subject
to constraint that the even lowest valuation consumer who buys a house, if he buys from
ULD 1 gets a surplus at least as high as the surplus he would get from buying a house
from ULD 2 at price p2 = c2. The surplus constraint can be written as follows:
max
h
;b2(c2)i k1 p1  max h;b2(c2)i k2 t c2 , p1  max h;b2(c2)i (k1   k2)+c2+t
If this constraint is not binding when ULD 1 solves its unconstrained prot maximization
problem, then its optimal price is the one given in section 3.5.1. Otherwise, to be a
monopolist, ULD 1 has to charge p1 = max
h
;b2(c2)i (k1   k2) + c2 + t. To summarize:
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Proposition 3.16 If ULD 1 has a natural advantage and wants to be a monopolist, its
optimal price is:
p1 = min
"
max
h
;b2(c2)i (k1   k2) + k22
2
+ t;max
"
k1;
k21
2
+ k1( + 1)
2
##
Proof. It follows from the solution of the constrained prot maximization problem of
ULD 1 and the result in section 3.5.1.
If the optimal monopoly price is such that the surplus constraint is binding, ULD 1
may be better o¤ by not decreasing the price so much and share the market with ULD 2.
In that case, the equilibrium prices will be the ones presented in this section.
3.6 Numerical analysis
In the previous section we analyzed the Nash equilibrium of the price competition game,
considering all the cases that can potentially occur. For a given case, that analysis allowed
us to characterize the equilibrium prices and how they change with the quality levels of
the two rms. However it does not provide a global view of how equilibrium prices change
with the vector of quality levels (k1, k2). In this section, we use numerical analysis to
get a more global perspective of how the equilibrium prices and prots change with the
quality levels (k1, k2) and what are the types of equilibria that occur.
In order to do numerical analysis we used the software GAUSS. We developed a pro-
gram that computes the Nash Equilibrium of the price game for given quality levels
(k1; k2). For each vector of quality levels the program computes the equilibrium prices,
the equilibrium prots and the type of equilibria.
3.6.1 Cases where the unit cost of transportation is nil
In this section we consider the case where the transportation costs are nil. In this case
there is symmetry between the two rms. Our numerical simulations considered  = 2 (we
chose  > 1 to guarantee that, even in the monopoly case, we would have cases where the
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Table 3.1: Type of equilibrium for several combinations of k1 and k2, when t = 0 and
 = 2.
k1jk2 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
0 NO M2FC M2FC M2FC M2FC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC NO
0.5 M1FC DB M2FC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK M1FC
1 M1FC M1FC DB DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK DFCK M1FC
1.5 M1FC DFC DFC DB DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK M1FC M1FC
2 M1FC DFC DFC DFC DB DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK M1PC M1FC
2.5 M1PC DFC DFC DFC DFC DB DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK M1PC M1PC
3 M1PC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DB DFC DFC DFC M1PC M1PC M1PC
3.5 M1PC DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DB DFC M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
4 M1PC DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DB M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
4.5 M1PC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFC DFC DFC M2PC M2PC DB M1PC M1PC M1PC
5 M1PC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC DB M1PC M1PC
5.5 M1PC DFCK DFCK M2FC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC DB M1PC
6 NO M2FC M2FC M2FC M2FC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC NO
equilibrium involves full coverage). Table 3.1 shows the type of equilibrium that occurs
for every combination of (k1;k2), when k1 and k2 vary from 0 to 6, with jumps of 0:5. Note
that when ki = 0 or ki = 6 the demand of ULD i is equal to zero (quality is too low in
the rst case and too high in the second case).
Table 3.1 describes seven types of equilibria. When the two ULD have zero demand
(which happens when ki = 0 or ki = 6, with i = 1; 2) none of the ULD operates in the
market (in the table this case is denoted by NO). When k1 = k2, excluding the cases
where k1 = k2 = 0 and k1 = k2 = 6, we get the Bertrand equilibrium where the two ULD
charge a price equal to marginal cost and have nil prot.
When k2 = 0 or k2 = 6 and 0 < k1 < 6, only ULD 1 operates. We obtain an
equilibrium where ULD 1 operates with full coverage (M1FC) or an equilibrium where
ULD 1 operates with partial coverage (M1PC), the last case occurs for higher values of
k1. Symmetrically when k1 = 0 or k1 = 6 and 0 < k2 < 6, only ULD 2 operates and we
obtain either the equilibrium where ULD 2 operates with full coverage (M2FC) or, for
higher values of k2, we obtain the equilibrium where ULD 2 operates with partial coverage
(M2PC).
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When k2 > k1 > 0, we obtain ve types of equilibria: both ULD operate with full
coverage (DFC); or both ULD operate with full coverage but in a kink case, where ^ = 
(DFCK) which means that the lowest valuation consumer gets zero surplus; or ULD 2
operate with full coverage (M2FC); or when k2 is too high and k1 is also high we obtain
the equilibria where ULD 1 operates with partial coverage (M1PC). Finally, for very high
values of k2 and low values of k1, ULD1 operates with full coverage (M1FC).
Symmetrically, when k1 > k2 > 0, we obtain DFC; or DFCK; or M1FC; or M1PC
when k1 is not very high. When k1 is very high, if k2 is also high we obtain the equilibria
where ULD 2 operate with partial coverage (M2PC) whereas for lower values of k2 we get
the equilibrium where ULD 2 operates with full coverage (M2FC).
For  = 2 and t = 0, we can analyze how the equilibrium prices and equilibrium prots
change with the quality levels of the two ULD. Figure 3.13 shows how the equilibrium
price of ULD i changes with its own quality level, ki, for given values of the other ULD
quality (considering kj = 0, kj = 2 and kj = 3). Based on Figure 3.13, we can conclude
the following:
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Figure 3.13: Equilibrium price of ULDi, pi , as a function of its quality level, ki, given the
values of kj.
Result 3.17 With nil transportation cost, for a given value of kj, the equilibrium price
of ULD i, pi , is an increasing and convex function of its own quality level, ki.
To explain the behavior of the equilibrium price of ULD i as a function of its own
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quality, there are three e¤ects that need to be taken into account. The rst e¤ect is the
impact of increasing ki on the demand of ULD i. As its quality increases, the demand
of ULD i also rises and, for a given marginal cost, it is optimal for ULD i to increase its
price. The second e¤ect is due to the fact that, as the quality of ULD i rises, its marginal
cost also rises, which leads to an higher optimal price. These two e¤ects imply a shift
to the right of ULD i best response function, leading to higher equilibrium prices. The
third e¤ect is the impact of increasing ki on the demand of ULD j. When ki increases,
the demand of ULD j decreases and thus the optimal price of rm j will be lower (the
best response function of ULD j shifts downwards). The last e¤ect alone would lead to
a lower equilibrium pi , since prices are strategic complements. However, the two rst
e¤ects dominate the last one and, therefore, pi is increasing with ki. Moreover, the e¤ect
of increasing ki on the marginal cost of rm i, explains the fact that equilibrium price is a
convex function of ki. This happens because the marginal costs are a quadratic function
of quality and, consequently, the impact of ki on pi , through the marginal costs, becomes
larger as ki increases.
Figure 3.13 also shows the impact of changing kj on the equilibrium price of ULD
i. Note that for kj = 0 (or, equivalently, for kj = 6), ULD j has no demand and thus
ULD i is a monopolist. We observe that the optimal prices under monopoly are above
the equilibrium prices when there is competition between the two rms (which happens
when kj = 2 or kj = 3 in the gure). Hence Figure 3.13 shows very clearly the e¤ect of
competition on the equilibrium prices.
Figure 3.14 shows the equilibrium price of ULD i, pi , as a function of the quality level
of the rival, kj, (considering ki = 1; ki = 2 and ki = 3). This gure allows us to conclude
the following:
Result 3.18 With nil transportation cost, for intermediate values of ki, the equilibrium
price of ULD i, pi , is a non-monotonic function of kj. For small values of kj, p

i is
decreasing with kj, but, after a certain point, pi becomes an increasing function of kj.
Finally, for very high values of kj, pi is constant. In other words, for intermediate values
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of ki and kj, the equilibrium price of ULD i follows a U relationship with kj.
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Figure 3.14: Equilibrium price of ULDi, pi , as a function of the quality of ULDj, kj, given
the values of ki.
How can we explain the U shaped relationship between pi and kj? When we look at
the impact of kj on the equilibrium price of ULD i, there are two e¤ects that need to be
considered. The rst e¤ect is the direct impact of kj on the demand of ULD i. When kj
increases, for given prices, Di decreases. This direct e¤ect implies a lower optimal price
for ULD i (the best response function of ULD i shifts to the left). This e¤ect alone implies
a lower equilibrium price for ULD i, pi . However there are also indirect e¤ect that need to
be considered. When kj increases, the demand and the marginal costs of ULD j increase,
leading to an upward shift in the best response of ULD j. Since ULD j increases its price,
and prices are strategic complements, in equilibrium ULD i also increases its price. Hence
the two e¤ects have opposite signs: the direct e¤ect is negative whereas the indirect e¤ect
is positive. The previous result shows that, for small values of kj the rst e¤ect dominates
the second one and thus pi decreases with kj. However, for higher values of kj the second
e¤ect dominates and hence pi is increasing with kj. This result is quite intuitive because,
for high values of kj, the marginal costs of ULD j increase a lot with kj (since marginal
costs are quadratic on quality), explaining why the second e¤ect dominates.
Note that the U-shaped relationship only holds for intermediate values of kj. As we
know, when kj = 0 or when kj is too high, ULD j has no demand and therefore ULD i is
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a monopolist and charges its optimal price which is not a function of kj (this explains the
horizontal sections of pi in gure 3.14). This gure also shows the e¤ect of competition
on the equilibrium prices, since equilibrium price is lower when kj is intermediate and the
two ULDs operate in the market.
Let us now analyze the equilibrium prots. Figure 3.15 shows the equilibrium prot
of ULD i as a function of ki, for given values of kj. We rst plot the case where ULD i
has a monopoly (which happens when kj = 0 or kj = 6): Under monopoly, the optimal
prot function is a concave function of ki: the prot starts growing with quality, it reaches
a maximum, and after that prot declines with quality till it becomes nil. Figure 3.16,
shows the equilibrium prot of ULD i as a function of ki but now considering intermediate
values of kj (kj = 2 and kj = 3). As it can be seen, the shape of the equilibrium prot is
quite di¤erent from the one observed under monopoly.
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Figure 3.15: Equilibrium prot of ULDi, i , as a function of its quality, ki, when kj = 0
or kj = 6.
The results in Figures 3.15 and 3.16 can be summarized as follows:
Result 3.19 With nil transportation cost, when kj is nil or when kj is too high, ULD
i is a monopoly and the corresponding optimal prot is a concave function of its own
quality level, ki (with a unique global maximum). For intermediate values of kj, both
ULDs operate and, for given kj, the equilibrium prot of ULD i has two local maxima:
one with ki < kj and the other one with ki > kj.
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Figure 3.16: Equilibrium prot of ULDi, i , as a function of its quality, ki, when kj = 2
and when kj = 3.
The shape of the equilibrium prot under duopoly shows the benets of di¤erentiation.
For a given quality of ULD j, kj, ULD i is always better o¤ if he chooses a quality level
di¤erent from the rivals one (choosing the same quality implies zero prot). But ULD i
can di¤erentiate either with a lower quality or with a higher quality than the rival quality.
Figure 3.16 suggests that, when kj is low, ULD i is better o¤ if he di¤erentiates by
choosing a higher quality. However, when kj is high, ULD i is better o¤ by di¤erentiating
by choosing a lower quality. This Figure also suggests that the best response functions in
the rst stage of the game (when ULDs choose their housing qualities), are discontinuous
(till a certain point it is better to choose a quality lower than the rival, after that point
it is better to chose a quality higher that the rival). This intuition will be important in
the next chapter.
3.6.2 Cases with positive unit transportation costs
In this subsection we analyze what happens when the unit transportation costs are pos-
itive. In this case, the two ULDs are no longer in a symmetric position and hence it is
important to describe what happens in equilibrium for each of the ULDs. We analyze the
di¤erent equilibria, when t = 0:5 and  = 2 (the value chosen for the unit transportation
costs is relatively low so as to guarantee that we have cases where both ULDs operate).
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Table 3.2: Type of equilibrium for several combinations of k1 and k2, when t = 0:5 and
 = 2.
k1jk2 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
0 NO M2PC M2FC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC NO
0.5 M1FC M1FC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK M1FC
1 M1FC M1FC M1FC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK DFCK M1FC M1FC
1.5 M1FC M1FC M1FC M1FC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK M1FC M1FC
2 M1FC M1FC DFC M1FC M1FC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK M1PC M1FC
2.5 M1PC DFC DFC DFC DFC M1FC DFC DFC DFC DFC M1PC M1PC M1PC
3 M1PC DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFC M1FC DFCK DFC M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
3.5 M1PC DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC M1FC DFCK M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
4 M1PC DFCK DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
4.5 M1PC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DPC DPC M1PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
5 M1PC DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK DFCK M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M1PC M1PC M1PC
5.5 M1PC DPC DFCK M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M1PC M1PC
6 NO M2PC M2FC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC M2PC NO
Table 3.2 shows the type of equilibrium for the various combinations of k1 and k2, when
k1 and k2 vary from 0 to 6 with jumps of 0:5.
As we can see in table 3.2, we have six types of equilibria. Like before, when ki = 0 or
ki = 6 and kj = 0 or kj = 6 both ULDs have no demand and thus none of them operates
in the market (this case is denoted by NO in the table). However when 0 < k1 = k2 < 6,
we get a quite di¤erent type of equilibrium than the one with nil transportation costs. In
these cases, the demand function is discontinuous (like when t = 0) but now ULD 1 has an
advantage because consumers have to incur transportation costs if they buy a house from
ULD 2. Therefore we obtain equilibria where only ULD 1 operates, with full coverage
(M1FC) for lower qualities and with partial coverage (M1PC) for higher qualities.
When k2 = 0 or k2 = 6 and 0 < k1 < 6, for low values of k1 we obtain an equilibrium
where ULD 1 operates with full coverage(M1FC) whereas for high values of k1 only ULD
1 operates but with partial coverage (M1PC). Symmetrically when k1 = 0 or k1 = 6
and 0 < k2 < 6, we obtain an equilibrium where ULD 2 operates with partial coverage
(M2PC) except for k2 = 1 where also only ULD 2 operates but with full coverage.
When k2 > k1 > 0, we obtain four types of equilibria: both ULD operate with full
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coverage (DFC); or both ULD operate with full coverage but, ^ = , in a kink case
(DFCK); or for high values of k2 and small values of k1 only ULD 1 operates with full
coverage (M1FC); for high values of k2 and k1 we obtain a equilibria where only ULD 1
operates but with partial coverage (M1PC).
When k1 > k2 > 0, we obtain the following types of equilibrium: for low values of
k1 we obtain an equilibrium where only ULD 1 operates with full coverage (M1FC); for
intermediate values of k1, we obtain an equilibrium where both ULD operate with full
coverage (DFC) or the same but in a kink case (DFCK); or both operate with partial
coverage (DPC); or when k1 is very high we obtain the equilibrium where ULD 2 operate
with partial coverage (M2PC).
Let us now analyze the equilibrium prices and prots for each ULD, for di¤erent
quality levels. Figure 3.17 shows p1 as a function of k1(on the left) and p

2 as a function
of k2(on the right) for given values of k2 and k1, respectively.
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Figure 3.17: Equilibrium price of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as a function of their quality levels
The behavior of the equilibrium prices as a function of the ULDs quality is very
similar to the one observed with nil transportation costs. For k2 = 0, k2 = 2 and k2 = 3,
as we can see, p1 is an increasing and convex function of k1. Similarly, for given values of
k1, p2 is an increasing and convex function of k2.
Result 3.20 With positive unit transportation costs, for given the values of kj, the equi-
librium price of ULD i, pi ; is an increasing and convex function of its own quality, ki.
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The intuition for this result is the same than in the case where t = 0. An increase
in ki a¤ects positively the demand of ULD i and negatively the demand of ULD j, for
given prices. Moreover increasing ki leads to an increase in ULD i marginal costs. The
positive impact on Di and on the marginal cost lead to an higher pi whereas the negative
impact on Dj tends to decrease pi , but the rst two e¤ects outweigh the last one. The
convex shape of pi can be explained by the convex shape of the marginal costs, which are
a quadratic function of quality.
Figure 3.18 represents, on the left side, the values p1 as a function of k2 (considering
k1 = 2; k1 = 4 and k1 = 5); on the right side, it shows the values of p2 as a function
of k1 (considering k2 = 2; k2 = 4 and k2 = 5). Note that the equilibrium price of ULD
2 are slightly lower than the equilibrium prices of ULD 1. However, the behavior of the
equilibrium prices as a function of the quality level of the rival ULD is very similar to the
one observed when t = 0.
Result 3.21 With positive unit transportation cost, for intermediate values of ki, the
equilibrium price of ULD i, pi , is a non-monotonic function of kj. For small values of
kj, pi is decreasing with kj but, after a certain point, p

i becomes an increasing function
of kj. Finally, for very high values of kj, pi is constant. In other words, for intermediate
values of ki and kj, the equilibrium price of ULD i follows a U relationship with kj.
The explanation for this result is the same than when t = 0. When kj increases, the
demand of ULD i decreases, leading to lower optimal price for ULD i (the best response
function of ULD i shifts to the left). However, when kj increases, the demand and the
marginal costs of ULD j increase, leading to an upward shift in the best response of ULD
j. Since ULD j increases its price, and prices are strategic complements, in equilibrium
ULD i also increases its price. Hence the two e¤ects have opposite signs: the direct e¤ect
is negative whereas the indirect e¤ect is positive. For small values of kj the rst e¤ect
dominates the second one (thus pi decreases with kj) while, for higher values of kj, the
second e¤ect dominates (hence pi is increasing with kj).
As it can be seen in Figure 3.18, in the three curves of the two graphics, when the
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quality of the rival ULD is nil or when it is too high, ULD i is a monopolist and its
optimal price does not depend on kj. For intermediate values of kj there is a duopoly and
the price is below the monopoly price (due to the competition e¤ect).
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Figure 3.18: Equilibrium price of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as a function of the housing quality
of ULD 2 and ULD 1, respectively.
The previous results show that, the existence of positive unit transportation costs
does not change the overall pattern of the equilibrium prices. Nevertheless, it should
be highlighted that the equilibrium prices are not symmetric when t > 0. However the
biggest di¤erence in terms of results is the one regarding the equilibrium prots. When the
quality is too low or too high, we have a monopoly, and the shape of the prot is concave
like the case of nil cost of transportation, as we can see in Figure 3.19. But when we have
a duopoly, the result is very di¤erent, has we can see in the Figure 3.19 that represents
the equilibrium prot of ULD 1, 1, as a function of k1, considering k2 = 1; k2 = 2:5 and
k2 = 4 (on the left). In the same Figure, on the right, we have the equilibrium prot of
ULD 2, 2, as a function of k2. Those gures allows us to conclude the following:
Result 3.22 With positive unit transportation cost, when kj is nil or when kj is too high,
ULD i is a monopoly and the corresponding prot is a concave function of its own quality
level, ki. For low values of kj, the prot of ULD i quasi-concave function of its own
quality and the optimal prot occurs for ki > kj. For high values of kj, the prot of ULD
i quasi-concave function of its own quality and the optimal prot occurs for ki < kj. For
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intermediate values of k2, the equilibrium prot of ULD 1 has a local maximum when
k1 = k2. On the other hand, for intermediate values of k1, the equilibrium prot of ULD
2 has two local maxima: one with k2 < k1 and the other one with k2 > k1.
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Figure 3.19: Equilibrium prot of ULD1 and ULD2 , 1 and 

2, as a function of its
quality, k1and k2 , when the quality of the other ULD is equal to 1; 2:5 and 4.
The equilibrium prot when only one of the ULD operates (because the other ULD
has a nil quality or a too high quality) has a similar shape to the one observed when t = 0
(but the monopoly prot of ULD 2 is lower due to the transportation cost). However,
for intermediate values of the rival ULDs quality, the behavior of the equilibrium prot
is very di¤erent for ULD 1 and ULD 2. While ULD 2 gets an higher equilibrium prot
when its quality is di¤erent from k1, ULD 1 equilibrium prot may be higher when its
quality is precisely the same than the quality of ULD 2. The explanation is that when the
unit cost of transportation is di¤erent from zero, ULD 1 has an advantage when qualities
are the same and is able to capture all the demand by charging p1  c2 + t (ULD 1 is a
constrained monopolist). This result is important for the next chapter as it suggests that
we may have a problem in nding an equilibrium in the rst stage of the game.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyzed the second stage of a two stage game between two urban land
developers, in which one of the ULD is located at the CBD while the other is located
in the periphery. In the rst stage the two ULD simultaneously choose the quality of
housing and, in the second stage, they simultaneously choose prices. This chapter solved
the second stage price competition game, considering the qualities chosen in the rst stage
as given.
The chapter started with a literature review on vertical di¤erentiation models, that
allowed us to recognize the basic features of those models and to construct our model
according the specicities of the urban land developers. Since the location of the house
is an important characteristic, our model incorporates unit cost of transportation when
a house is bought from the ULD located in the periphery. In addition we consider xed
and variable costs of quality improvement.
To solve the model, we started by deriving the demand functions of each ULD and
by imposing conditions on the quality levels of the two ULDs so that their demand is
positive. In addition we dened some cut-o¤ valuations which enabled us to simplify
the exposition. Next, we found analytically the Nash equilibrium for di¤erent quality
vectors. Our analysis is very complete as we explore all the possible cases both in terms
of who operates in the market (in some cases both operate while in others only one of
the urban land developers operates) as well as in terms of the market coverage (in some
cases the whole market is covered while in others there is only partial market coverage).
For this reason, this chapter is an important contribution to the quality di¤erentiation
literature. Furthermore the chapter characterizes the Nash equilibrium (equilibrium type,
equilibrium prices and equilibrium prots) for the di¤erent quality levels.
The results show that with nil transportation costs, the equilibrium price of a ur-
ban land developer is increasing with its housing quality, for given values of the quality
of the other urban land developer. This result is also valid with positive unit cost of
transportation. On the other hand, the equilibrium price of a urban land developer is a
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non-monotonic function of the quality of the rival ULD. In particular, for intermediate
values of the other ULD quality, there is a U shaped relationship between the equilibrium
price of a ULD and the housing quality of the other ULD. This result is also valid with
positive transportation costs.
When the quality of an ULD is nil or very high, this ULD has zero demand and
the other ULD is a monopolist. In this case the monopolist ULD optimal prot is a
concave function of its housing quality: the equilibrium prot rst grows with quality, up
to a maximum, and then falls and becomes equal to zero. This result is also valid with
positive unit cost of transportation. However when the two ULD have intermediate levels
of quality and the unit transportation cost is nil, the equilibrium prot functions have two
local maxima (one where the ULD chooses a quality lower than the rival, the other one
where the ULD chooses a quality higher than the rival). Therefore, the equilibrium prot
functions show the benets of di¤erentiating the quality. Moreover the result shows that,
when the other ULD has a low quality it is better to di¤erentiate by choosing a higher
quality, whereas when the rival has a high quality it is better to di¤erentiate by choosing
a lower quality.
On the other hand, with positive unit transportation costs and intermediate quality
levels, the ULD located at the periphery prefers to di¤erentiate but the ULD located
at the CBD may be better o¤ by choosing a quality level equal to the rivals one and
«exploiting» its locational advantage.
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Appendix A Demand functions
Case where k1 = k2
We start by analyzing the case when k1 = k2 = k. In this case the two urban land
developers are o¤ering precisely the same quality, thus there is no di¤erentiation and the
consumers always prefer the ULD that has a lower total price. For instance, the consumers
strictly prefer ULD 1 if:
k   p1 > k   t  p2 , p1 < p2 + t
Similarly, if p2 < p1   t all consumers prefer ULD 2. Finally, when p1 = p2 + t the
consumers will be indi¤erent between buying from ULD 1 or ULD 2. In this case we
assume that demand is equally divided among the two ULD. Consequently, demand is
discontinuous. If p1  k all consumers prefer to buy from ULD 1 than not to buy, hence
the market is fully covered and the demand of ULD 1 is:
D1(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > p2 + t
1
2
if p1 = p2 + t
1 if p1 < p2 + t
If k < p1  ( + 1) k the market is only partially covered when ULD 1 operates and
demand of ULD 1 is:
D1(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > p2 + t
1
2
 
 + 1  p1
k

if p1 = p2 + t
 + 1  p1
k
if p1 < p2 + t
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The demand function of rm 2 can be derived in a similar manner. If p2  k   t
D2(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p2 > p1   t
1
2
if p2 = p1   t
1 if p2 < p1   t
If k   t < p2  ( + 1) k   t the demand of ULD 2 is:
D2(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p2 > p1   t
1
2
 
 + 1  p2+t
k

if p2 = p1   t
 + 1  p2+t
k
if p2 < p1   t
Case where k2 > k1
If ULD 2 o¤ers a higher quality house than ULD 1, the demand functions depend on the
price di¤erential, p2   p1. If p2   p1 > ( + 1) (k2   k1)   t all consumers prefer to buy
from ULD 1 than from ULD 2. Depending on its price the ULD 1 may get the whole
demand (if p1  k1) or cover the market only partially (if k1 < p1  ( + 1) k1). Figure
3.20 illustrates these two cases.
q+1
( +1) -q k p1 1
( +1) - -q k t p2 2
q
U k p1 1 1( ) =q q -
U2( )q = q - -k t p2 2
q+1
( +1) -q k p1 1
qk p1 1-
( +1) - -q k t p2 2
q
U k p1 1 1( ) =q q -
U2( )q = q - -k t p2 2
Demand of ULD 1 Demand of ULD 1
Figure 3.20: If the price di¤erential p2   p1 is high, ULD 2 gets no demand. Depending
on p1, ULD 1 may cover the whole market (left) or not (right).
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Thus when p2   p1 > ( + 1) (k2   k1)  t the demand functions are:
D1(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > ( + 1) k1
 + 1  p1
k1
if k1 < p1  ( + 1) k1
1 if p1 < k1
and D2(p1; p2) = 0
The opposite happens when the price di¤erential is very low. If p2 p1 < max

;b1 (k2   k1) 
t, ULD 1 has zero demand whereas ULD 2 covers the whole market (if p2  k2   t) or
covers the market partially (if k2   t < p2  ( + 1) k2   t). Figure 3.21 illustrates these
two cases.
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Demand of ULD 2 Demand of ULD 2
Figure 3.21: If the price di¤erential p2  p1 is low, ULD 1 gets no demand. Depending on
p2, ULD 2 may cover the whole market (left) or not (right).
Thus when p2   p1 < max

;b1 (k2   k1)  t the demand functions are:
D1(p1; p2) = 0 and D2(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p2 > ( + 1) k2   t
 + 1  p2+t
k2
if k2   t < p2  ( + 1) k2   t
1 if p2 < k2   t
For price di¤erentials between the two previous limits, both urban land developers
operate. Figure 3.22 illustrates this case when there is full coverage (left) and when there
is partial coverage (right). Note that the higher quality urban land developer, ULD 2,
covers the higher valuation consumers while ULD 1 covers the lower valuation consumers.
If p1 is relatively high, the lower valuation consumers prefer not to buy. Thus when
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Figure 3.22: For intermediate price di¤erentials, both rms operate either with full cov-
erage (left) or with partial coverage (right). ULD 2 covers higher valuation consumers
while ULD 1 covers lower valuation consumers.
max

;b1 (k2   k1)  t < p2   p1  ( + 1) (k2   k1)  t the demand function are:
D1(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > ( + 1) k1
p2 p1+t
k2 k1  
p1
k1
if k1 < p1  ( + 1) k1
p2 p1+t
k2 k1    if p1 < k1
and
D2(p1; p2) =
8<: 0 if p2 > ( + 1) k2   t + 1  p2 p1+t
k2 k1 if p2  ( + 1) k2   t
Case where k1 > k2
Let us now consider the case where ULD 1 o¤ers a house of higher quality than ULD 2.
If p1  p2 > ( + 1) (k1   k2) + t all consumers prefer to buy from ULD 2 than from ULD
1. Depending on its price ULD 2 may get the whole demand (if p2  k2   t) or cover
the market only partially (if k2   t < p2  ( + 1) k2   t). Figure 3.23 illustrates these
two cases.
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Figure 3.23: If the price di¤erential p1   p2 is high, ULD 1 gets no demand. Depending
on p2, ULD 2 may cover the whole market (left) or not (right).
Thus when p1   p2 > ( + 1) (k1   k2) + t the demand functions are:
D1(p1; p2) = 0 and D2(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p2 > ( + 1) k2   t
 + 1  p2+t
k2
if k2   t < p2  ( + 1) k2   t
1 if p2 < k2   t
The opposite happens when the price di¤erential is very low. If p1 p2 < max

;b2 (k1   k2)+
t, ULD 2 has zero demand whereas ULD 1 covers the whole market (if p1  k1) or covers
the market partially (if k1 < p1  ( + 1) k1. Figure 3.24 illustrates these two cases.
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Figure 3.24: If the price di¤erential p1  p2 is low, ULD 2 gets no demand. Depending on
p1, ULD 1 may cover the whole market (left) or not (right).
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Thus when p1   p2 < max

;b2 (k1   k2) + t the demand functions are:
D1(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p1 > ( + 1) k1
 + 1  p1
k1
if k1 < p1  ( + 1) k1
1 if p1 < k1
and D2(p1; p2) = 0
For price di¤erentials between the two previous limits, both urban land developers
operate. Figure 3.24 illustrates this case, both when the market is whole covered (left)
and when the market is not fully covered (right). Note that in both cases, ULD 1 serves
the consumers who value most quality.
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Figure 3.25: For intermediate price di¤erentials, both rms operate either with full cov-
erage (left) or with partial coverage (right). ULD 1 covers higher valuation consumers
while ULD 2 covers lower valuation consumers.
Thus when max

;b2 (k1   k2) + t < p1   p2  ( + 1) (k1   k2) + t the demand
function are:
D1(p1; p2) =
8<: 0 if p1 > ( + 1) k1 + 1  p1 p2 t
k1 k2 if p1  ( + 1) k1
and
D2(p1; p2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p2 > ( + 1) k2   t
p1 p2 t
k1 k2  
p2+t
k2
if k2   t < p2  ( + 1) k2   t
p1 p2 t
k1 k2    if p2 < k2   t
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Appendix B Gauss Program
/*****************************************************************/
/* This program computes the NE of the quality-price game for given quality levels */
/* (k1,k2). For each (k1,k2) the equilibrium prices, prot and type of equilibria is */
/* computed for each rm. */
/*****************************************************************/
/******* Parameters of the model ***********************/
tetab=2;
t=0.5;
saltok=0.5; /* step size for the iterations on the quality levels*/
format /rdt 6,3; /* print number formatation */
tol=10^(-12);
/*****************************************************************/
/**Finding the second stage NE for various levels of (k1,k2) and saving ***********/
/******** the NE variables of each rm in a matrix ************/
/*****************************************************************/
k1min=0;
k2min=0;
k1max=2*(tetab+1);
k2max=2*(tetab+1);
niterk1=int((k1max-k1min)/saltok)+1; /* number of iterations for quality level of rm 1 */
niterk2=int((k2max-k2min)/saltok)+1; /* number of iterations for quality level of rm 2 */
pi1mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prot of rm 1 */
pi1mat=pi1mat*(-5);
pi2mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prot of rm 2 */
pi2mat=pi2mat*(-5);
typemat=zeros(niterk1,niterk2);
p1mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prices of rm 1 */
p1mat=p1mat*(-5);
p2mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prices of rm 1 */
p2mat=p2mat*(-5);
k2mat=zeros(1,niterk2);
k1mat=zeros(niterk1,1);
k1=k1min;
iterk1=1;
do while k1<= k1max;
c1=(k1^2)/2; /* marginal production costs as a function of k1 */
fcost1=0.001;
k2=k2min;
iterk2=1;
pi1eq=-5;
pi2eq=-5;
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do while k2<= k2max;
c2=(k2^2)/2; /* marginal production costs as a function of k2 */
fcost2=0.001;
/******** Condition for a rn to have zero demand if price is ************/
/******** greater or equal than marginal cost ************/
k2dmin= (tetab+1)-sqrt((tetab+1)^2-2*t);
k2dmax=(tetab+1)+sqrt((tetab+1)^2-2*t);
k1dmax=2*(tetab+1);
k1dmin=0;
/*****************************************************************/
/****** Cases where both rms have zero demand ****************************/
/*****************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax); /* both rms have
zero demand */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
if k2 eq 0;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=1;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 2 has zero demand ***********************/
/***********************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 gt k1dmin and k1 lt k1dmax); /* only rm 1
operates */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k2 eq 0;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2jtetab*k1;
p1eq=maxc(p1eq);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
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/*** check if rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq(tetab*k1))and (p1eq ge c1);
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=2;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq ((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)) and (tetahat1 le (tetab+1)) and (p1eq ge c1); /*check
if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=3;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 1 has zero demand ***********************/
/***********************************************************************/
if (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax) and (k2 gt k2dmin and k2 lt k2dmax); /* only rm 2
operates */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
p2eq=(c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2jk2*tetab-t;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
/*** check if rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
if p2eq eq (k2*tetab-t) and p2eq ge c2;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=4;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if p2eq eq (c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2 and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2; /*check if we
are in this case */
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pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=5;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 = k1 (but with positive demand) *****************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 eq k1;
if t eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=6;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
/**** check if there is partial coverage *******************/
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2;
p1eqc=p1eqj(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi1eq=(tetab+1-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=7;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
p1eqc=(k1*tetab)j(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi1eq=(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=8;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
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endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 > k1 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 gt k1;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
p1eq=((1-tetab)*(k2-k1)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((tetab+2)*(k2-k1)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=9;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(k1*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+2*c1*k2+c2*k1+t*k1)/(4*k2-k1);
p2eq=(2*k2*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1*k2+2*c2*k2-t*(2*k2-k1))/(4*k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-(p1eq/k1))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=10;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but in a kink case******/
p1eq=tetab*k1;
p2eq=((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
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if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if we
are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=101;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((k2*c1/k1)-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetastar le tetahat2 and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=11;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
p2eq=p2eqj((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
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typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=12;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in this
case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=121;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/**** check if NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage but in a kink case******/
p1eq=c1;
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar eq tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /*check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
pi1eq=-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=122;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
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pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=13;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=131;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat1-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1; /*check if, given prices, we
are in this case */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=14;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=141;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
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if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=142;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k1 > k2 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
if k1 gt k2;
p1eq=((tetab+2)*(k1-k2)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((1-tetab)*(k1-k2)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetahat2 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if, given prices, we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=15;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(2*k1*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+k1*(2*c1+c2+t))/(4*k1-k2);
p2eq=(k2*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+2*k1*c2+k2*c1-t*(2*k1-k2))/(4*k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
if tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if, given prices, we are in this case */
pi2eq=(tetastar-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetastar)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
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typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=16;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but we are in a kink case ******/
p2eq=tetab*k2-t;
p1eq=((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c1+p2eq+t)/2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if,
given prices, we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=161;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j(k1*(c2+t)/k2);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetahat1;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetahat1 and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=17;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=171;
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goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j(tetab*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetab and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=18;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=181;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=19;
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goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=191;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat2-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=20;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=201;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
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pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=202;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
nefoundc:
k2mat[1,iterk2]=k2;
k2=k2+saltok;
iterk2=iterk2+1;
endo;
k1mat[iterk1,1]=k1;
k1=k1+saltok;
iterk1=iterk1+1;
endo;
pidif=pi1mat-pi2mat;
pdif=p1mat-p2mat;
print "Type of NE";
print typemat;
print "Equilibrium prices for rm 1";
print p1mat;
print "Equilibrium prices for rm 2";
print p2mat;
print "Equilibrium prot for rm 1";
print pi1mat;
print "Equilibrium prot for rm 2";
print pi2mat;
print "prots matrizes di¤erence";
print pidif;
print "prices matrizes di¤erence";
print pdif;
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Chapter 4
Housing quality choice in a price
competition duopoly model
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter and in this one we consider a two stage model among two urban
land developers,where one of the producers stays at the CBD while the other one has
a more decentralized location. In the rst stage of the game the two ULDs take simul-
taneously their quality decisions and in the second stage of the game they compete in
prices.
The emphasis in the last chapter was in the price competition game among the two
ULDs, for given quality levels. We started by deriving analytically the Nash equilibrium
of the second stage of the game. Next, using numerical simulations we studied how the
equilibrium changes with the qualities chosen in the rst stage. In particular we looked
at the equilibrium prices, at the equilibrium prots and at the type of equilibrium that
occurs for each vector of qualities.
In this chapter we complete the analysis of the game by looking at the choice of the
quality levels in the rst stage of the game. Thus we determine the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the quality-price game. Since it is impossible to get an
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analytical solution for the equilibrium qualities, we determine the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE) numerically. We used the Gauss software to create a program that
computes the SPNE of the quality-price game. The program determines rst the Nash
equilibrium of the second stage game, for given quality levels. That is, for each (k1; k2)
we obtain the equilibrium prices and prots for each ULD. This procedure is repeated for
many (k1; k2), and the equilibrium values for prot is saved in two matrices: the prot
matrix of ULD 1 and the prot matrix of ULD 2. These two matrices are then used
to determine the best response functions of each ULD. To determine the best response
function of ULD 1, for each k2 we nd the maximum value of ULD 1 prot in the column
that corresponds to k2 in the ULD 1 prot matrix and identify the value of k1 that
corresponds to it. Similarly, to identify the best response function of ULD 2, for each k1
we nd the maximum value of ULD 2 prot in the row that corresponds to k1 in the ULD 2
prot matrix and identify the value of k2 that corresponds to it. Next the Nash equilibrium
of the rst stage game is determined, by identifying the pairs of (k1, k2) such that both
ULDs are simultaneously in their best responses. After identifying the equilibrium values
for (k1; k2), the corresponding NE of the second stage is determined. This procedure
is repeated for many values of the unit transportation cost, t; and the lowest quality
valuation, , to analyze how the equilibrium changes with these two parameters. The
program computes the equilibrium qualities and the equilibrium prots for each ULD as
well as the types of equilibria.
In this chapter we present the results of our numerical analysis of the SPNE. The chap-
ter starts by looking at the best response functions of both ULDs, we analyze the best
response functions for nil unit transportation costs as well as for positive unit transporta-
tion costs. Next we discuss how the equilibria change as we vary the unit transportation
costs and the lowest quality valuation. In particular, we analyze the type of equilibria
that occur, the changes in the equilibrium qualities and the changes in the equilibrium
prots.
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4.2 Best Response Functions
In this section we present graphically some of the results obtained in our numerical analy-
sis. In order to give an idea of the shape of the best response functions and how they
change as we vary the unit transportation cost, t, we present the best response functions
with nil transportation case (in which case there is symmetry between the two ULDs)
and the best response functions when t is positive (in which case there is no symmetry).
4.2.1 Best response for nil unit cost of transportation
First we analyze the best response function for nil cost of transportation (t = 0). In
order do obtain the values for the best response function of both ULDs, we considered
increments of 0:1 for k1 and for k2. We compute the best response functions for  = 0:5,
for  = 2, and for  = 3:5 (see in Figure 4.1). By looking at these best response functions
we will get an idea of the impact of the quality valuation parameter on the best response
functions.
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Figure 4.1: Best response functions for t = 0, when  = 0:5,  = 2 and  = 3:5.
As we can see in Figure 4.1, for nil unit cost of transportation the best response
functions for ULD 1 and ULD 2 are symmetric. Figure 4.1 shows that the best response
functions when  = 0:5 and when  = 2 have a very similar shape. On the contrary, for
 = 3:5 the shape of the best response functions is quite di¤erent.
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In the two rst graphs we observe that when k2 = 0, or when k2 is very high, ULD 1
best response is to choose the monopoly quality level (for instance, when  = 2 and k2 = 0
or k2 > 5:6, the best response of ULD 1 is k1 = 2). This explains the vertical segment of
ULD 1 best response when k2 is very high (similarly, the best response function of ULD 2
has an horizontal segment for very high values of k1). In addition, for low values of k2 it
is optimal for ULD 1 to di¤erentiate o¤ering higher quality, whereas for higher values of
k2, it is optimal for ULD 1 to di¤erentiate by o¤ering lower quality. The best response of
ULD 2 is similar. Therefore, when both ULDs operate, the best response functions show
that it is optimal to choose a quality di¤erent from the quality of the rival ULD. When the
other ULD o¤ers a low quality, it is optimal to di¤erentiate by o¤ering an higher quality.
When the other ULD o¤ers a high quality, it is optimal to di¤erentiate by o¤ering a
lower quality. When  = 0:5 and when  = 2, there are two SPNE that involve quality
di¤erentiation (in one ULD 1 has higher quality, in the other one the reverse happens).
The following result summarizes these conclusions:
Result 4.1 For low and intermediate values of the lowest quality valuation parameter, ,
and nil transportation cost, for low values of kj it is optimal for ULDi to di¤erentiate by
o¤ering an higher quality level, ki > kj. On the other hand, for high values of kj it is
optimal for ULDi to di¤erentiate by o¤ering a lower quality, ki < kj. When kj = 0 or for
very high values of kj, ULDi is a monopoly and it is optimal to o¤er the monopoly quality
level. Furthermore, the best response functions are positively sloped, except when the ULD
is about to become an unconstrained monopolist. There are two SPNE that involve quality
di¤erentiation.
In Figure 4.1, the graphic on the right side, for  = 3:5, shows a much more complex
behavior and more discontinuities in the best response functions. We can see that for low
values of k2 (ranging from 0 to 1.2) ULD 1 o¤ers the monopoly quality level k1 = 3:5.
This also happens for very high values of k2 (ranging from 8.2 to 9). In this case, since the
consumers value a lot quality, if ULD2 o¤ers a very low quality it will have no demand
and ULD 1 can behave as a monopolist. On the other hand, if ULD 2 o¤ers a too high
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quality it will also have no demand (unless it charges a price below marginal cost) and
again ULD 1 can behave as a monopolist. For values of k2 between 1.3 and 3.5, ULD
1 di¤erentiates o¤ering higher qualities. For values of k2 between 3.6 and 4.5, ULD 1
continues to di¤erentiate o¤ering higher qualities, but much higher qualities. In addition,
in this region the best response function of ULD 1 is negatively sloped (that is, ULD
1 reduces its quality when k2 increases). For k2 ranging from 4.6 to 6.5, ULD 1 still
di¤erentiates o¤ering higher qualities however its quality is again increasing with k2. For
k2 ranging from 5.7 to 7.9, ULD 1 di¤erentiates o¤ering lower quality and its quality
increases with k2. For k2 ranging from 8 to 8.1, ULD 1 still di¤erentiates o¤ering lower
quality but its quality is decreasing with k2.
In terms of equilibria, in our numerical simulations we got 8 equilibria when t = 0
and  = 3:5. However we believe that this is due to the fact that numerically we have to
dene the increments in k1 and k2 and we may not have considered a grid ne enough to
obtain only two equilibria.
4.2.2 Best response for positive unit cost of transportation
Let us now analyze the best response function for positive unit cost of transportation. In
this case the best response functions of the two ULDs are no longer symmetric. Since we
want to analyze the impact of changes in the unit cost of transportation, we set  = 1,
and obtain the best response functions for both ULDs, for t = 0:2, t = 0:5, and t = 0:8
(see Figure 4.2).
When t = 0:2 and t = 0:5 the shape of the best response function of ULD 2 is
very similar to the one observed when t = 0. That is, for small values of k1, ULD 2
wants to di¤erentiate with higher qualities whereas for high values of k1 ULD 2 wants
to di¤erentiate by o¤ering lower qualities. For very high k1, ULD 2 o¤ers the monopoly
quality level and the best response function is horizontal. On the other hand, when t = 0:8,
the best response function of ULD 2 has a di¤erent behavior, since for intermediate values
of k1 the best response of ULD 2 is to choose k2 = 0 (which implies that it will have
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Figure 4.2: Best response functions for  = 1 when t = 0:2, t = 0:5, and t = 0:8.
no demand). This means that if k1 is intermediate, it is not protable for ULD 2 to
di¤erentiate either by choosing a lower quality or by choosing an higher quality and thus
ULD 2 ends up choosing a nil quality.
Regarding the shape of the best response of ULD 1, there are more di¤erences relatively
to the nil transportation cost case and as the value of t changes. For t = 0:2 we still observe
that for relatively low value of k2, ULD 1 wants to di¤erentiate by o¤ering higher qualities
whereas for high values of k2, ULD 1 wants to di¤erentiate by o¤ering lower qualities.
However there are two novelties. The rst is that o¤ering the monopoly quality level is
now a best response for some positive but very low values of k2 (due to t being positive,
if k2 is below a certain level, ULD 2 has no demand). The other new feature is that
there are some intermediate values of k2 for which the best response of ULD 1 is to o¤er
precisely the same quality, k1 = k2). This last feature is even more visible when t = 0:5
where the best response function of ULD has a big segment that coincides with the 45o
line. As t increases the shape of the ULD 1 best response function starts having less clear
discontinuities and becomes closer and closer to being a vertical line in the monopoly
quality level. This means that as t increases, ULD 1 is able to have a behavior which
does not di¤er much from the behavior of a monopolist. In particular for t = 0:8, ULD 1
either behaves as a monopolist (for low and for high values of k2) or o¤ers a quality which
is slightly above the monopoly level.
In terms of equilibria when  = 1, there are four SPNE when t = 0:2, there is no
equilibrium when t = 0:5 since there is no intersection between the two best response
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functions (this can also be seen in Table 4.1), and there is a SPNE when t = 0:8 where
ULD 1 is a monopolist since the interception of the two best response functions happens
when k2 = 0 and the best response function of ULD 1 is vertical (we can see in Table 4.1
that this is an equilibrium where ULD 1 has partial coverage).
4.3 Impact of parameters changes on the equilibria
In this section we analyze the changes on the equilibrium when t varies between 0 and
1 (with increments of 0.1), and  varies from 0 to 3:5 (with increments of 0:5). We rst
describe the type of equilibria that occurs for each combination of these two parameter
values. Next we analyze how the equilibrium qualities and prots change as t increases
and as  increases.
4.3.1 Type of equilibria
The type of equilibria that occurs depends on the values of parameters t and . Table
4.1 presents the type of equilibrium for several combinations of the parameters values (t
varies between 0 and 1 and  varies between 0 and 3:5).
Table 4.1: Type of equilibria for several combinations of the parameters t (row) and 
(column).
t j  0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0 DPC DPC DFCK DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK
0.1 DPC DPC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK
0.2 M1PC DPC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK
0.3 M1PC NO DFC DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK
0.4 M1PC M1PC NO DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK
0.5 M1PC M1PC NO DFC DFC DFC DFC DFCK
0.6 M1PC M1PC NO DFC DFC DFC DFCK DFCK
0.7 M1PC M1PC M1PC DFC NO DFC DFCK DFCK
0.8 M1PC M1PC M1PC NO NO DFCK DFCK DFCK
0.9 M1PC M1PC M1PC NO NO DFC DFCK DFCK
1 M1PC M1PC M1PC NO NO NO DFCK DFCK
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For the parameters values considered, there are four types of equilibria. The equilibria
where ULD 1 operates alone in the market with partial coverage are denoted by M1PC.
The equilibria where both ULDs operate and there is partial coverage of the market, since
the lower valuation consumers are not served, are denoted by DPC. The equilibria where
both ULDs operate in the market but with full coverage are denote by DFC. Finally,
there are equilibria where both ULDs operate in the market with full coverage but we are
in a kink case (DFCK) where even a very small increase in prices would lead to partial
coverage. We describe the cases where no equilibria occurs as NO, the explanation for
these cases is on the discontinuities of the qualities best response functions combined with
the fact that the best response functions are asymmetric when t is positive.
The results are very clear. For low values of  there is partial coverage whereas for
higher values of values of  there is full coverage of the market. For low values of the
quality valuation parameter, when t is small (ranging from 0 to 0:2), we obtain the type
of equilibria DPC, where both ULDs operate but with partial coverage. As the values of
t rise from 0:2 to 1, and still with small values of  ( ranging from 0 to 1) we may either
have the equilibrium where ULD 1 operates as a monopoly with partial coverage (M1PC)
or have no equilibrium. The explanation for the existence of equilibria with monopoly
and partial coverage, is that ULD1 as an advantage with respect to its rival when the
unit cost of transportation is high, since ULD 1 is located at the CBD while the rival is
not. It also interesting to note that the cases of no equilibria are a sort of transition case
between the case of duopoly equilibria with partial coverage and the case of monopoly
with partial coverage.
For high values of the taste parameter , namely when the lowest valuation of housing
quality is between 1.5 and 3:5, we only get equilibria where the two ULDs operate with full
coverage (DFC) or the two ULDs operate with full coverage but in a kink case (DFCK)
or, for higher values of t, we may get no equilibrium.
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4.3.2 Equilibrium qualities and prots
Having the matrices for the SPNE qualities k1 and k

2, and the matrices for the corre-
sponding equilibrium prots, 1 and 

2, we now analyze how the equilibrium qualities
and prots changes with t and . Figure 4.3 shows how the equilibrium qualities, k1 and
k2, change with the unit cost of transportation t, considering the cases when  = 1 and
when  = 3. The gure illustrates what happens to the equilibria where, under duopoly,
ULD 1 has the lowest quality (k1 < k

2).
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium qualities of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as a function of t, when  = 1 and
when  = 3.
In Figure 4.3 , on the left we can see k1 as a function of t. When  = 1, the equilibrium
quality of ULD 1 starts by being increasing with the unit cost of transportation, then for
values of t greater than 0:7 the quality is constant with t. The fact that k1 does not
change with t for t  0:7 is explained by the fact that ULD 1 is a monopolist for these
very high values of the unit transportation costs. When  = 3, we can observe that for
low values of t (ranging from 0 to 0.2) the housing quality of ULD 1 decreases with t, but
for t between t = 0:3 and t = 0:6 ULD 1 quality is increasing with t. Finally, for t  0:8
the housing quality of ULD 1 is constant with t.
In the graphic on the right we can see the plot for the equilibrium quality of ULD 2,
k2, as a function of t. When  = 1, we can observe that k

2 increases with t, from 0 to 0:1,
but then it decreases from 0:1 to 0:2, however the equilibrium quality maintains an almost
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constant value for low values of t ( from t = 0 to t = 0:3). For greater values of t (ranging
from 0:7 to 1) the equilibrium qualities of ULD 2 are nil and hence ULD 1 is a monopoly.
When  = 3, the behavior of the equilibrium quality of ULD2 is similar (although with
bigger jumps) to the one observed for ULD1. In fact k2 starts by decreasing with t (from
0 to 0:2), jumps down and becomes increasing with t (from 0:3 to 0:6). Finally, for t
ranging from 0:6 to 1 the ULD 2 quality decreases slightly with t.
To analyze how the equilibrium qualities, k1 and k

2, change with , we represent the
cases where t = 0:2 and t = 0:5. In Figure 4.4, on the left we have the equilibrium quality
of ULD 1, k1 as a function of . In this graphic we can observe that the equilibrium quality,
k1, is increasing with the valuation of the housing quality, and that the equilibrium quality
is higher for the series that represents the larger unit cost of transportation, t = 0:5.
On the right side of Figure 4.3 we have a graphic for the equilibrium quality of ULD 2,
k2 as a function of . When t = 0:2, the equilibrium quality of ULD 2 is increasing with
the valuation of housing quality. When t = 0:5, the quality also grows with the valuation
of the housing quality, however the equilibrium quality of ULD 2 is nil for  = 0 and
 = 0:5, since for those values of  we have a monopoly of ULD 1. The explanation for
the increasing quality with the valuation of housing quality is obvious. If the consumers
value more the housing quality then the ULDs have an interest in o¤ering higher quality
of housing.
Result 4.2 For given values of the unit cost of transportation, t, the equilibrium qualities
of ULD 1 and ULD 2, k1 and k

2, are increasing with the lowest valuation of housing
quality, .
We now examine the behavior of the equilibrium prot of each ULD as a function of
t and as a function of . Figure 4.5 shows the behavior of the equilibrium prot of both
ULDs as a function of t, considering the case where  = 0:5 and the case where  = 2:5:
The left side of Figure 4.5 shows that, for ULD 1, when the consumers have a low
quality valuation ( = 0:5), the equilibrium prot starts to slightly rise with the unit cost
of transportation, but then becomes constant at a very low value. On the contrary, when
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium qualities of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as a function of , when t = 0:2
and when t = 0:5.
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium prots of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as a function of t, when  = 0:5 and
when  = 2:5.
the quality valuation of the consumer is high ( = 2:5), the equilibrium prot increases
more steeply with the unit cost of transportation. For t = 0:8 we have a very high prot
value (remember that this is an equilibrium where we have a kink case). This graph shows
that ULD 1 benets from the existence of the transportation costs since it has a strong
advantage due to its location at the CBD. This benet is even more e¤ective when we
have a high valuation of housing quality by the consumers.
Result 4.3 In general, the equilibrium prots of ULD 1 are non-decreasing with the unit
cost of transportation.
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On the other hand, the right side of Figure 4.5 reveals that, for the ULD 2, in both
cases,  = 0:5 and  = 2:5 (for low and high valuation of housing quality), the equilibrium
prot declines strongly as the unit cost of transportation increases. Like we explained
above this is due to the fact that ULD 2 has a peripheral location, so the unit cost of
transportation is a disadvantage for ULD 2, and therefore the equilibrium prots decline
with the increase of the unit cost of transportation. Again for t = 0:8, we have an increase
of the equilibrium prot, we think that the explanation is because we are in a kink case.
Result 4.4 In general, the equilibrium prots of ULD 2 are non-increasing with the unit
cost of transportation.
Figure 4.6 shows the equilibrium prots as a function of , when t = 0 and when
t = 0:5. As we can see on the left graph, the equilibrium prot of ULD 1, when t = 0:5,
there is an increase of the equilibrium prot with  for smaller values of  (ranging from
0 to 1:5). For values of  between 1:5 and 3 the equilibrium prot of ULD 1 is constant
with . Finally, for  = 3:5 we have a very high equilibrium prot value. Observing the
case when t = 0, we can conclude that we have the same pattern of the case with t = 0:5.
We conclude that the equilibrium prot of ULD 1 grows sharply for very high valuations
of house quality.
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Figure 4.6: Equilibrium prots of ULD 1 and ULD 2 as function of , when t = 0 and
when t = 0:5
Analyzing the equilibrium prot of ULD 2 as a function of  (the graphic on the right
in Figure 4.6), we observe that for t = 0:5, for  = 0 and  = 0:5 the equilibrium prot
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of ULD 2 is nil. From  = 1:5 to  = 3 and t = 0:5, ULD 2 has a constant equilibrium
prot. Finally, for  = 3:5 the prot of ULD 2 grows sharply. We conclude that for the
two ULDs the equilibrium prot grows for high valuations of housing quality.
Result 4.5 For t = 0 and t = 0:5, the equilibrium prot of ULD 1 and ULD 2 grows
sharply for high valuations of housing quality.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we solved numerically the rst stage of the quality-price game, by using a
Gauss program. The chapter started by looking at the best response functions for both
ULDs. Next we studied the impact of changes in the unit transportation cost and in
the lowest valuation of housing quality parameter on the equilibria. In particular, we
investigated the type of equilibria that happen, the impact on the equilibrium qualities
and the impact on the equilibrium prots.
Regarding the best response functions, when the unit transportation cost are null,
we can conclude that if the rival ULD o¤er low quality, it is optimal to di¤erentiate by
o¤ering a higher quality level. On the other hand, if the rival ULD o¤ers a high quality, it
is optimal to di¤erentiate by o¤ering a lower quality. Finally, when the rival ULD o¤ers
a very high quality, the ULD is a monopoly and o¤ers the optimal monopoly quality.
The best response functions are discontinuous and, typically, there are two subgame
perfect Nash equilibria, involving quality di¤erentiation. In one equilibrium ULD o¤ers
a lower quality that ULD 2, in the other equilibrium the reverse happens. For higher
housing quality valuations the best response functions present even more discontinuities
and there are intermediate values of the rival quality valuation where the best response
functions are negatively sloped. However the best response functions still show the «desire
to di¤erentiate» from the rival.
With positive transportation costs, the best response of ULD 2 is similar to the one
observed without transportation costs. However, when the unit transportation cost is
high and ULD 1 o¤ers an intermediate quality, it may not be protable for ULD 2 to
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di¤erentiate and ULD 2 may be better o¤ by o¤ering a nil quality. On the other hand,
the best response function of ULD 1 shows some interesting features, including the fact
that, for intermediate values of the quality o¤ered by the rival, ULD 1 best response
may be to o¤er precisely the same quality. Another feature is that there are more values
of the quality o¤ered by ULD 2, where ULD 1 is a monopolist. Furthermore, as the
transportation costs increase, the best response function of ULD 1 becomes closer and
closer to the quality o¤ered by a monopolist (ULD 1 is a sort of constrained monopolist).
With positive transportation costs, we may still have cases where there are two SPNE,
but we may have cases with no equilibrium and we may also have cases where there is a
unique equilibrium where only ULD 1 operates.
In the second part of this chapter we analyzed the impact of changes in the parameter
values on the equilibria. Our rst conclusion is that the type of equilibria that occur,
depends on the combinations of the parameters values. When the lowest housing quality
valuation is small and for low values of the unit cost of transportation, in equilibrium both
urban land developers operate but with partial coverage of the market. For higher values
of the unit transportation cost, we have an equilibrium where the ULD 1 is a monopoly
with partial coverage, this is due to the advantage that ULD 1 has as consequence of the
unit cost of transportation. Moreover we may also have cases where no equilibria exists.
For higher values of the lowest housing quality valuation parameter, we have two
similar types of equilibria: in the rst the two ULDs operate with full coverage and, in
the second, the two ULDs operate with full coverage, but in a kink case where even a
small increase in prices would imply partial coverage. The fact that the market is fully
covered when the consumers value a lot housing quality is intuitive, because in this case
the two urban land developers have interest in serving all the consumers.
Besides looking at the type of equilibria that arise for each combination of the parame-
ters values, we also studied how the equilibrium values of qualities and prots change with
the transportation costs and with the lowest quality valuation parameter. Our numerical
results show that, for given values of the unit cost of transportation, the qualities of both
ULDs are increasing with the valuation of housing quality. Similarly, the equilibrium
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prots of both ULDs are increasing with the valuation of housing quality.
Moreover, the equilibrium prots of the urban land developer located at the CBD
(ULD 1), when we have a high value of the lowest valuation of housing quality, are
increasing with the unit transportation cost. And for ULD 2 ( the ULD located far away
from the CBD), the equilibrium prots decreases with the unit cost of transportation,
this reects the disadvantage of this ULD with the unit cost of transportation.
We could not observe a conclusive pattern of how the quality that each ULD o¤ers
varies with the unit cost of transportation. But for high values of the unit cost of trans-
portation, and small values of the housing quality valuation, the urban land developer
located at the periphery (ULD 2) does not operate in the market, due to its disadvantage
with the unit cost of transportation.
Appendix - Gauss Program
/*****************************************************************/
/* This program computes the SPNE of the quality-price game. */
/* The program determines rst the NE of the second stage game, for */
/*given quality levels (k1,k2) and for each (k1,k2) the equilibrium prot */
/* of each rm, (Pi1,Pi2), is computed. This is repeated for many (k1,k2) */
/* of each rm, (Pi1,Pi2), is computed and saved in two matrices. */
/* Next the NE of the rst stage game is determined (k1eq,k2eq) and the */
/* corresponding NE of the second stage game is determined. */
/* This procedure is repeated for many values of the parameter values*/
/* so as to analyze how the equilibrium changes with changes in the parameters*/
/*****************************************************************/
/****** Inicial parameters of the model ***********************/
tol=10^(-12);
tetabmin=0;
tetabmax=3,5;
tmin=0; /* minimum value of transportation cost */
tmax=1;
saltetab=0.5;
saltot=0.1;
saltok=0.05; /* step size for the iterations on the quality levels*/
nitert=int((tmax-tmin)/saltot)+1; /* number of iterations for transportation cost*/
nitertb=int((tetabmax-tetabmin)/saltetab)+1; /* number of iterations for quality level of
rm 1*/
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/**** Create matrices to keep the SPNE values of qualities, prices, prots and welfare ****/
k1eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
k2eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
k1eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
k2eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
typemat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
typemat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
p1eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
p2eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
p1eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
p2eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
pi1eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
pi2eqmat1=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
pi1eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
pi2eqmat2=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
tmat=zeros(nitert,1);
tetabmat=zeros(1,nitertb);
nspnemat=zeros(nitert,nitertb);
/***** Start iterations of level the of transportation costs and lowest valuation ********/
t=tmin;
itert=1;
do while t<= tmax;
tetab=tetabmin;
itertb=1;
do while tetab<= tetabmax;
/*****************************************************************/
/******** Finding the second stage NE for various levels of (k1,k2) and saving ***/
/******** the NE variables of each rm in a matrix ************/
/*****************************************************************/
k1min=0;
k2min=0;
k1max=2*(tetab+1);
k2max=2*(tetab+1);
niterk1=int((k1max-k1min)/saltok)+1; /* number of iterations for quality level of rm 1 */
niterk2=int((k2max-k2min)/saltok)+1; /* number of iterations for quality level of rm 2 */
pi1mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prot of rm 1 */
pi1mat=pi1mat*(-5);
pi2mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prot of rm 2 */
pi2mat=pi2mat*(-5);
typemat=zeros(niterk1,niterk2);
p1mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prices of rm 1 */
p1mat=p1mat*(-5);
p2mat=ones(niterk1,niterk2); /* create matrix to save the NE prices of rm 1 */
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p2mat=p2mat*(-5);
k2mat=zeros(1,niterk2);
k1mat=zeros(niterk1,1);
k1=k1min;
iterk1=1;
do while k1<= k1max;
c1=(k1^2)/2; /* marginal production costs as a function of k1 */
fcost1=0.001;
k2=k2min;
iterk2=1;
pi1eq=-5;
pi2eq=-5;
do while k2<= k2max;
c2=(k2^2)/2; /* marginal production costs as a function of k2 */
fcost2=0.001;
/******** Condition for a rn to have zero demand if price is ************/
/******** greater or equal than marginal cost ************/
k2dmin= (tetab+1)-sqrt((tetab+1)^2-2*t);
k2dmax=(tetab+1)+sqrt((tetab+1)^2-2*t);
k1dmax=2*(tetab+1);
k1dmin=0;
/*****************************************************************/
/****** Cases where both rms have zero demand ****************************/
/*****************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax); /* both rms have
zero demand */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
if k2 eq 0;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=1;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 2 has zero demand ***********************/
111
/***********************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 gt k1dmin and k1 lt k1dmax); /* only rm 1
operates */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k2 eq 0;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2jtetab*k1;
p1eq=maxc(p1eq);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
/*** check if rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq(tetab*k1))and (p1eq ge c1);
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=2;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq ((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)) and (tetahat1 le (tetab+1)) and (p1eq ge c1); /*check
if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=3;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 1 has zero demand ***********************/
/***********************************************************************/
if (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax) and (k2 gt k2dmin and k2 lt k2dmax); /* only rm 2
operates */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
p2eq=(c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2jk2*tetab-t;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
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/*** check if rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
if p2eq eq (k2*tetab-t) and p2eq ge c2;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=4;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if p2eq eq (c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2 and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2; /*check if we
are in this case */
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=5;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 = k1 (but with positive demand) *****************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 eq k1;
if t eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=6;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
/**** check if there is partial coverage *******************/
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2;
p1eqc=p1eqj(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi1eq=(tetab+1-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=7;
goto nefoundc;
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endif;
p1eqc=(k1*tetab)j(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi1eq=(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=8;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 > k1 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 gt k1;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
p1eq=((1-tetab)*(k2-k1)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((tetab+2)*(k2-k1)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=9;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(k1*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+2*c1*k2+c2*k1+t*k1)/(4*k2-k1);
p2eq=(2*k2*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1*k2+2*c2*k2-t*(2*k2-k1))/(4*k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-(p1eq/k1))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
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pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=10;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but in a kink case******/
p1eq=tetab*k1;
p2eq=((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if we
are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=101;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((k2*c1/k1)-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetastar le tetahat2 and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=11;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
p2eq=p2eqj((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
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p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=12;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in this
case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=121;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/**** check if NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage but in a kink case******/
p1eq=c1;
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar eq tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /*check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
pi1eq=-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=122;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
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p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=13;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=131;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat1-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1; /*check if, given prices, we
are in this case */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=14;
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goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=141;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=142;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k1 > k2 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
if k1 gt k2;
p1eq=((tetab+2)*(k1-k2)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((1-tetab)*(k1-k2)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetahat2 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=15;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(2*k1*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+k1*(2*c1+c2+t))/(4*k1-k2);
118
p2eq=(k2*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+2*k1*c2+k2*c1-t*(2*k1-k2))/(4*k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
if tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi2eq=(tetastar-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetastar)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=16;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but we are in a kink case ******/
p2eq=tetab*k2-t;
p1eq=((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c1+p2eq+t)/2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if,
given prices, we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=161;
goto nefoundc; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j(k1*(c2+t)/k2);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetahat1;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetahat1 and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
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p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=17;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=171;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j(tetab*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetab and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=18;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=181;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
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p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=19;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=191;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat2-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=20;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
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p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=201;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typemat[iterk1,iterk2]=202;
goto nefoundc;
endif;
endif;
nefoundc:
k2mat[1,iterk2]=k2;
k2=k2+saltok;
iterk2=iterk2+1;
endo;
k1mat[iterk1,1]=k1;
k1=k1+saltok;
iterk1=iterk1+1;
endo;
/*****************************************************************/
/************* Find the SPNE levels of k1 and k2 ***************************/
/*****************************************************************/
iterk1=1;
nspne=0;
k1eq=-1;
k2eq=-1;
do while iterk1 <= niterk1;
iterk2=1;
do while iterk2 <= niterk2;
pi1col=pi1mat[.,iterk2];
pi2row=pi2mat[iterk1,.];
pi2col=pi2row;
if pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]==maxc(pi1col) and pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]==maxc(pi2col); /* this
checks if a given (k1,k2) is a NE */
/* if we are in the region where no NE of 2nd stage game was found, jump to line with level
notane */
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if pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]==(-500) or pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]==(-500);
goto notane;
else;
k1eq=k1min+saltok*(iterk1-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE value of
k1 */
k2eq=k2min+saltok*(iterk2-1); /* if NE is in feasible region, this gives us SPNE value of
k2 */
nspne=nspne+1;
typeeq=0;
/* Identify the type of equilibrium and compute SPNE prices and prots */
k1=k1eq;
k2=k2eq;
c1=(k1^2)/2;
c2=(k2^2)/2;
fcost1=0.001;
fcost2=0.001;
/****************************************************************************/
/****** Cases where both rms have zero demand ****************************/
/****************************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax); /* in this case both
rms have zero demand */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
if k2 eq 0;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
typeeq=1;
goto nefound;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 2 has zero demand ***********************/
/***********************************************************************/
if (k2 le k2dmin or k2 ge k2dmax) and (k1 gt k1dmin and k1 lt k1dmax); /* in this case
only rm 1 operates */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
if k2 eq 0;
123
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
endif;
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2jtetab*k1;
p1eq=maxc(p1eq);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
/*** check if rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq(tetab*k1))and (p1eq ge c1);
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=2;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
if (p1eq eq ((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)) and (tetahat1 le (tetab+1)) and (p1eq ge c1); /*check
if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=3;
goto nefound;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases where only rm 1 has zero demand ***********************/
/***********************************************************************/
if (k1 le k1dmin or k1 ge k1dmax) and (k2 gt k2dmin and k2 lt k2dmax); /* in this case
only rm 2 operates */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
if k1 eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=0;
else;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
endif;
p2eq=(c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2jk2*tetab-t;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
/*** check if rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
if p2eq eq (k2*tetab-t) and p2eq ge c2;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
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typeeq=4;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if p2eq eq (c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2 and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2; /*check if we
are in this case */
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=5;
goto nefound;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 = k1 (but with positive demand) *****************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 eq k1;
if t eq 0;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
typeeq=6;
else;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
/**** check if there is partial coverage *******************/
p1eq=(c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2;
p1eqc=p1eqj(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi1eq=(tetab+1-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=7;
goto nefound;
endif;
p1eqc=(k1*tetab)j(c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
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pi1eq=(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=8;
goto nefound;
endif;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k2 > k1 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
if k2 gt k1;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
p1eq=((1-tetab)*(k2-k1)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((tetab+2)*(k2-k1)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetahat1 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=9;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(k1*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+2*c1*k2+c2*k1+t*k1)/(4*k2-k1);
p2eq=(2*k2*(tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1*k2+2*c2*k2-t*(2*k2-k1))/(4*k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetahat1 gt tetab and tetahat1 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-(p1eq/k1))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=10;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
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endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but in a kink case******/
p1eq=tetab*k1;
p2eq=((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if, given
prices, we are in this case */
pi1eq=((p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1)-tetab)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=101;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((k2*c1/k1)-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
if tetastar le tetahat2 and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=11;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
p2eq=p2eqj((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c2-t+p1eq)/2;
p2eq=maxc(p2eq);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
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if tetastar le tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=12;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /* check if, given prices, we are in this
case */
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=121;
goto nefound;
endif;
/**** check if NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage but in a kink case******/
p1eq=c1;
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j(tetab*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar eq tetab and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2; /*check if, given prices, we are in
this case */
pi1eq=-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1))*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=121;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
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tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=13;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=131;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
p2eq=c2;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat1-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1; /*check if, given prices, we
are in this case */
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=14;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
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pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=141;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=142;
goto nefound;
endif;
endif;
/***********************************************************************/
/****** Cases when k1 > k2 ********************************************/
/***********************************************************************/
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate ******/
if k1 gt k2;
p1eq=((tetab+2)*(k1-k2)+2*c1+c2+t)/3;
p2eq=((1-tetab)*(k1-k2)+2*c2+c1-t)/3;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetahat2 le tetab and tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq
ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=15;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if NE does not have full coverage and both rms operate **/
p1eq=(2*k1*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+k1*(2*c1+c2+t))/(4*k1-k2);
p2eq=(k2*(tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+2*k1*c2+k2*c1-t*(2*k1-k2))/(4*k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
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if tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le tetastar and tetastar le (tetab+1)and p1eq ge c1 and
p2eq ge c2; /*check if we are in this case */
pi2eq=(tetastar-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetastar)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=16;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/**** check if NE has full coverage and both rms operate but we are in a kink case ******/
p2eq=tetab*k2-t;
p1eq=((tetab+1)*(k1-k2)+c1+p2eq+t)/2;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
if tetastar ge tetab and tetastar le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1 and p2eq ge c2; /*check if,
given prices, we are in this case */
pi2eq=((p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2)-tetab)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2))*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=161;
goto nefound; /* NE was found so we can jump to the end of the if loop */
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p1eqc=((c1+k1*(tetab+1))/2)j(k1*(c2+t)/k2);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetahat1;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetahat1 and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=17;
goto nefound;
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endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 ge tetab and tetahat1 le (tetab+1) and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat1)*(p1eq-c1)-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=171;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 1 operates and has full coverage **/
p1eqc=(tetab*k1)j(tetab*(k1-k2)+c2+t);
p1eq=minc(p1eqc);
p2eq=c2;
tetahat1=p1eq/k1;
tetastar=(p1eq-p2eq-t)/(k1-k2);
tetadif=tetastar-tetab;
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar le tetab and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=18;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat1 le tetab and p1eq ge c1;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost2;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c2;
pi1eq=p1eq-c1-fcost1;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi1eq;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p1eq;
typeeq=181;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and does not have full coverage **/
p2eqc=((c2+k2*(tetab+1)-t)/2)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
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tetadif=abs(tetadif);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=19;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 ge tetab and tetahat2 le (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=((tetab+1)-tetahat2)*(p2eq-c2)-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=191;
goto nefound;
endif;
/*** check if in the NE only rm 2 operates and has full coverage **/
p2eqc=(tetab*k2-t)j((tetab+1)*(k2-k1)+c1-t);
p2eq=minc(p2eqc);
tetahat2=(p2eq+t)/k2;
p1eq=c1;
tetastar=(p2eq-p1eq+t)/(k2-k1);
tetadif=tetastar-(tetab+1);
tetadif=abs(tetadif);
tetadif1=tetahat2-tetab;
tetadif1=abs(tetadif1);
if tetastar ge (tetab+1) and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=20;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif le tol and tetahat2 le tetab and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
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p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=201;
goto nefound;
endif;
if tetadif1 le tol and tetastar ge (tetab+1) and p2eq ge c2;
pi1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=-fcost1;
p1mat[iterk1,iterk2]=c1;
pi2eq=p2eq-c2-fcost2;
pi2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=pi2eq;
p2mat[iterk1,iterk2]=p2eq;
typeeq=202;
goto nefound;
endif;
endif;
endif;
endif;
nefound:
if nspne eq 1;
k1eqmat1[itert,itertb]=k1eq; /*save the SPNE of k1 in a matrix */
k2eqmat1[itert,itertb]=k2eq;
/* save the NE prot of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row corresponds to a value of k1,
and each columnn to the value of k2 */
pi1eqmat1[itert,itertb]=pi1eq;
/* save the NE prot of rm 2 in a matrix, where each row corresponds to a value of k1,
and each columnn to the value of k2 */
pi2eqmat1[itert,itertb]=pi2eq;
typemat1[itert,itertb]=typeeq;
endif;
if nspne eq 2;
k1eqmat2[itert,itertb]=k1eq; /*save the SPNE of k1 in a matrix */
k2eqmat2[itert,itertb]=k2eq;
/* save the NE prot of rm 1 in a matrix, where each row corresponds to a value of k1,
and each columnn to the value of k2 */
pi1eqmat2[itert,itertb]=pi1eq;
/* save the NE prot of rm 2 in a matrix, where each row corresponds to a value of k1,
and each columnn to the value of k2 */
pi2eqmat2[itert,itertb]=pi2eq;
typemat2[itert,itertb]=typeeq;
endif;
notane:
iterk2=iterk2+1;
endo;
iterk1=iterk1+1;
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endo;
nspnemat[itert,itertb]=nspne;
tetab=tetab+saltetab;
itertb=itertb+1;
endo;
t=t+saltot;
itert=itert+1;
endo;
print "no de equilíbrios";
print nspnemat;
print "k1 equilíbrio - primeira matriz";
print k1eqmat1;
print "k2 equilíbrio - primeira matriz";
print k2eqmat1;
print "tipo de equilíbrio - primeira matriz";
print typemat1;
print "Lucro 1 de equilíbrio - primeira matriz";
print pi1eqmat1;
print "Lucro 2 de equilíbrio - primeira matriz";
print pi2eqmat1;
print "k1 equilíbrio - segunda matriz";
print k1eqmat2;
print "k2 equilíbrio - segunda matriz";
print k2eqmat2;
print "tipo de equilíbrio - segunda matriz";
print typemat2;
print "Lucro 1 de equilíbrio - segunda matriz";
print pi1eqmat2;
print "Lucro 2 de equilíbrio - segunda matriz";
print pi2eqmat2;
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Conclusion
This thesis studied the supply side of the housing market taking into account the strategic
interactions that occur between urban land developers. The thesis started by reviewing
the literature on new housing supply, concluding that there are very few studies where
strategic interactions are taken into account. Next we developed a vertical di¤erentiation
model with two urban land developers. The two producers rst simultaneously decide the
quality of housing and then compete in prices. We assumed that one of the producers
stays at the CBD while the other has a more decentralized location. Moreover, our model
assumed that a quality improvement has xed costs but it also increases the marginal
production cost. In this chapter we summarize the main conclusions of our study.
The literature review allowed us to conclude that housing supply is understudied com-
paring with the extensive literature on housing demand. In spite of this, various studies
have been undertaken, mainly empirical studies but also some theoretical studies. Rela-
tively to the empirical studies, there are some studies using cross section or panel data
sets for metropolitan areas, but most of the studies use aggregated time series data. Cu-
riously, in spite of the di¤erences regarding the type of data and econometric estimation
methods, the main results are quite consistent across studies. Excluding some earlier
studies like Muth (1960) and Follain (1979), we can reject a perfectly elastic supply of
housing. Most studies nd an elastic housing supply but there are some studies that ob-
tain below unit elasticities. The studies that distinguish between short run and long run
elasticities reveal that price elasticity of housing supply is lower in the short run. More-
over, the studies that allow comparisons across countries or regions show that there are
signicant di¤erences in supply elasticities between countries and regions. For instance,
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the values of the price elasticity of supply are higher in the USA than in the UK. Regard-
ing the other determinants of housing supply, most empirical results are according to the
theoretical predictions. For instance, nancial costs, ination and sales delay inuence
negatively the housing supply. However there are also some results which are unexpected,
namely the inconclusive results with respect to the impact of construction costs. One
possible explanation for this inconclusive results is the di¢ culty in measuring accurately
the construction costs.
Our review on the articles that use game theory/ industrial organization models of
housing supply showed that the strategic interaction between land developers or construc-
tors is still understudied and hence there is a lot of potential in exploring this type of
models. We believe that there is a need to increase our understanding of the behavior
of constructors and land developers. This deeper understanding can come from the de-
velopment of theoretical models predicting their decisions in a context where there exists
strategic interactions between land developers and the estimation of empirical models
based on micro data. Strategic interaction models of housing supply may allow us to
understand how land developers make their decisions regarding the house location and
house quality, may allow us to explore the market structure of the housing market and
test if the market is competitive or if the land developers have some oligopolistic power.
By using data where the unit of analysis is the land developer, we may be able to re-
solve some counter-intuitive results such as those obtained with respect to the impact of
construction costs.
Most of the literature on housing markets assumes that the housing industry is per-
fectly competitive, but there is a growing support for imperfect competition models
(Arnott and Igarashi, 2000; Baudewyns, 2000). The existence of di¤erences in the hous-
ing quality, di¤erences in housing accessibility, di¤erences in households tastes, can be
sources of market power and lead to strategic interactions between the urban land devel-
opers. Therefore, in this study we applied game theory and industrial organization tools
to model housing supply. In chapters 3 and 4, we developed a dynamic duopoly game with
two stages. Our model is naturally a vertical di¤erentiation model. This type of models
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has been extensively studied in the literature in industrial economics, including models
with endogenous quality choice. However most of the literature that we have reviewed
consists of general theoretical models, that do not take into account the specicities of
the housing market, such as the location of the house.
The literature on vertical product di¤erentiation models, specically with endogenous
quality choice, can be divided according to the assumption that is made about the nature
of the costs of quality improvement. Some authors like Lambertini (2012) assume that
there are xed costs of quality improvement while variable costs do not change with
quality. This assumption is reasonable when producers improve quality by advertising or
by research and development. Other authors like Aoki (1996), argue that higher quality
requires more expensive inputs or a more specialized labour force. Motta (1993) compares
the two assumptions about the nature of the costs of quality improvement however he
does not incorporate simultaneously the two types of costs. The model developed in this
thesis, assumes that a quality improvement has xed costs and also variable costs. Thus
a quality improvement has cost implications both for the price-stage game as well as for
the quality-stage game. This is a contribution to the literature on vertical di¤erentiation,
since none of the existent studies incorporates simultaneously these two types of costs of
increasing quality. Another contribution of our study is that we analyzed if there is full
or partial coverage of the market in the subgame perfect equilibrium whereas most of the
studies on vertical di¤erential models consider either full coverage or partial coverage.
In the third and fourth chapter we analyzed a dynamic model with two ULDs, where
producers rst decide the housing quality and then compete in prices. We assume that
one of the producers stays at the CBD while the other has a more decentralized location.
Our model also considers, in the utility function a transport cost by unit of distance. In
the third chapter we solved the price competition game, considering the qualities chosen
in the rst stage as given. In chapter 4 we solved the rst stage of the game, nding the
equilibrium qualities for di¤erent combinations of the unit transportation cost and the
quality valuation parameter.
In chapter 3, we derived analytically the Nash equilibrium of the price-game, for given
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quality levels. Our analysis is very exhaustive as we explore all the possible cases both
in terms of who operates in the market, in some cases only one ULD operates in the
market and in others both operate, as well as in terms of the market coverage, in some
cases we have full coverage of the market and in others we have partial coverage of the
market. Because of this, the third chapter is an important contribution to the quality
di¤erentiation literature. We used numerical analysis, utilizing a Gauss program to obtain
and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the price competition game, the equilibrium type,
equilibrium prices and equilibrium prots for the di¤erent quality levels.
The results show that with nil transportation costs, the equilibrium price of a ur-
ban land developer is increasing with its housing quality, for given values of the quality
of the other urban land developer. This result is also valid with positive unit cost of
transportation. On the other hand, the equilibrium price of a urban land developer is a
non-monotonic function of the quality of the rival ULD. In particular, for intermediate
values of the other ULD quality, there is a U shaped relationship between the equilibrium
price of a ULD and the housing quality of the other ULD. This result is also valid with
positive transportation costs. This interesting result is due to the existence of direct and
strategic e¤ects. When the housing quality of the rival ULD increases, the demand of
the ULD decreases, which tends to decrease price. However, an increase in the housing
quality of the rival, increases the rivals demand and the rivals marginal cost, and hence
the rival has an incentive to increase its price. Since prices are strategic complements
this implies that the ULD increases its price. The non-monotonic relationship happens
because for lower values of the rival ULD housing quality, the direct e¤ect dominates,
whereas for higher values of the rivals quality the strategic e¤ect dominates.
When the quality of an ULD is nil or very high, this ULD has zero demand and
the other ULD is a monopolist. In this case the monopolist ULD optimal prot is a
concave function of its housing quality: the equilibrium prot rst grows with quality, up
to a maximum, and then falls and becomes equal to zero. This result is also valid with
positive unit cost of transportation. However when the two ULD have intermediate levels
of quality and the unit transportation cost is nil, the equilibrium prot functions may have
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two local maxima (one where the ULD chooses a quality lower than the rival, the other one
where the ULD chooses a quality higher than the rival). Therefore, the equilibrium prot
functions show the benets of di¤erentiating the housing quality. Moreover the result
shows that, when the other ULD has a low quality it is better to di¤erentiate by choosing
a higher quality, whereas when the rival has a high quality it is better to di¤erentiate by
choosing a lower quality. On the other hand, with positive unit transportation costs and
intermediate quality levels, the ULD located at the periphery prefers to di¤erentiate but
the ULD located at the CBD may be better o¤ by choosing a quality level equal to the
rivals one and «exploiting» its locational advantage.
In chapter 4 we solved numerically the rst stage of the quality-price game, by using
a Gauss program. We rst analyzed the best response function for the two ULDs. For nil
unit transportation cost, we can a¢ rm that if the rival ULD o¤ers low housing quality, it
is optimal for the ULD to di¤erentiate by o¤ering higher quality. Conversely, if the rival
o¤ers a high quality, it is optimal for the ULD to di¤erentiate by o¤ering a lower quality.
Finally, when the rival ULD o¤ers a very high quality (so high that rivals marginal costs
are so high that the rival has no demand unless its price is below marginal costs), the
ULD o¤ers the optimal monopoly quality. The best response functions are discontinuous,
and there are two SPNE, that involves quality di¤erentiation. If we have positive unit
transportation costs, the best response function of ULD 2 is almost the same has the one
with nil unit transportation costs, except when the unit transportation cost is high. In
this case, if ULD 1 o¤ers intermediate quality, ULD 2 may be better o¤ by choosing nil
quality. Furthermore, the best response function of ULD 1 has same interesting features.
In particular, for intermediate values of the quality o¤ered by the rival, ULD 1 best
response may be to o¤er the same quality and there are more values of the quality o¤ered
by ULD 2, for which ULD 1 is a monopoly.
Based on the numerical analysis of chapter 4, we concluded that the type of equilibria
that happens depends on the combinations of the parameters (unit transportation cost
and the lowest consumers quality valuation). When the housing quality valuation is
small and for low values of the unit cost of transportation, in equilibrium both urban
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land developers operate but with partial coverage of the market. For higher values of the
unit transportation cost, we have an equilibrium where the ULD 1 is a monopoly with
partial coverage. Moreover we may also have cases where no equilibria exists. For higher
values of the housing quality valuation parameter, we have two similar types of equilibria
where the two ULDs operate with full coverage. These results are quite intuitive. The
fact that the market is fully covered when the consumers value a lot housing quality is
expected, because in this case the two urban land developers have interest in serving
all the consumers. Similarly, when the valuation of the housing quality is lower and
transportation costs are higher it is also natural that in equilibrium only ULD 1 operates
with partial coverage, since this ULD has a locational advantage as the consumers do not
incur in transportation costs if the buy a house from ULD 1.
In chapter 4, we also studied how the equilibrium values of qualities and prots change
with the unit transportation cost and with the quality valuation parameter. Our numerical
results showed that, for given values of the unit cost of transportation, the equilibrium
qualities and the equilibrium prots of both ULDs are increasing with the valuation of
housing quality. Moreover, the equilibrium prots of the urban land developer located at
the CBD (ULD 1), when we have a high value of the lowest valuation of housing quality,
are increasing with the unit transportation cost. And for ULD 2 ( the ULD located far
away from the CBD), the equilibrium prots decreases with the unit cost of transportation,
this reects the disadvantage of this ULD with the unit cost of transportation.
Regarding future research we have some suggestions that can improve the study of
strategic interactions among urban land developers. The rst one, is to consider the
location as endogenous. This implies one more stage in the model. In this case the urban
land developers rst choose the location of their construction, in the second stage they
choose the quality and in the last stage they compete in prices. In such a model it will be
important to consider that di¤erent locations may have di¤erent land prices. A second
improvement may be to study the social optimality of the market equilibrium outcomes,
by including a welfare measure, that can be incorporated in the Gauss program. A nal
suggestion is to study the implications of changes in the marginal cost function. We
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assumed that marginal production costs are a convex function of the quality level, but it
would be interesting to explore what would happen under other assumptions relatively to
the way marginal production costs change with the quality.
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